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Abstract 
The objective of this dissertation is to study the opportunities and challenges of the 
Fair Trade certification system in altering conditions of coffee production in 
Nicaragua. The aim is to analyze the advantages as well as the constraints of Fair 
Trade in assisting farmers and their cooperatives, involving them in the governance 
of coffee value chains and improving labor conditions. The study highlights the 
context of increased globalization, deregulation of coffee markets, and declining and 
volatile coffee prices. 
The research methods utilized were primarily qualitative. Seven months of 
fieldwork was carried out in Nicaragua in 2005–2006 and 2008 to interview and 
observe a wide range of actors in Fair Trade and conventional coffee production and 
trade. Value chain analysis and convention theory were utilized as theoretical 
frameworks to understand if Fair Trade can improve the position of small-scale 
farmers and hired workers as participants in the global economy. Through the 
lenses of value chain analysis Fair Trade is seen as a governance mechanism where 
multiple actors with diverse interests influence each other in their interactions in 
establishing rules and norms for conditions of production.  
The results indicate that Fair Trade has supported certified producer 
organizations particularly during the extremely low coffee prices in 2000–2004. 
However, Fair Trade is a limited market existing parallel to conventional trade. This 
results in farmers and cooperatives selling a large part of their production to 
conventional markets and market prices having a greater importance for them than 
Fair Trade-regulated prices. Since 2005, market prices have frequently been above 
or close to Fair Trade minimum prices, reducing the significance of Fair Trade-
controlled prices. Certified farmers are vulnerable to price volatility also because 
when market prices are higher than Fair Trade minimum prices, the price volatility 
is the same for Fair Trade and conventional coffee.  
Fair Trade does not require that higher than market prices be paid to certified 
farmers. Prices and services offered by Fair Trade certified cooperatives to farmers 
have not remarkably exceeded those offered by conventional actors in Nicaragua. 
Although the minimum price system is a safety net in case of a future price collapse, 
the results of this research indicate that challenges exist in distributing benefits 
equally between and within producer organizations. The implementation of 
minimum prices also involves other practical challenges such as to what level prices 
should be set under constantly changing market prices. The physical quality 
characteristics of coffee affect its price and, because they are so varied, it is 
impossible to create a pricing system taking all these characteristics into 
consideration. 
The Fair Trade premium for social development has provided financing for 
cooperatives and farmers. While some of these funds have been targeted to pressing 
social needs, a large part of the funds have been used to finance improvements in 
producer organizations and to pay for certification fees, undermining the ability of 
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these funds to focus on social issues. In addition to the Fair Trade social premium, 
cooperatives and farmers have been assisted by numerous development projects. As 
a result, infrastructure in cooperatives has improved.  
A possibility for making Fair Trade pricing more transparent for all actors in the 
value chain would be to make the social premium a percentage of retail price of Fair 
Trade products and to document more carefully its use in improving cooperative 
and farm infrastructure and management as well as its use to improve social 
conditions in coffee producing communities. 
Fair Trade has not significantly altered the working conditions of hired labor in 
coffee production in Nicaragua. Because the advantages Fair Trade offers to farmers 
and cooperatives are limited and vary in different contexts, the system cannot 
present strict demands on improved working conditions.  
The participation of farmers and workers in formulating Fair Trade policies is 
narrow, as evidenced by most of the interviewed farmers and hired laborers not 
knowing they were involved in producing Fair Trade coffee and what this entailed. 
Despite changes aimed at involving producer organizations in Fair Trade 
governance, Northern actors exercise the greatest control of the system.  
Approximately half of Fair Trade certified farmers are also organically certified, 
globally and in Nicaragua. Although the Fair Trade/organic farmers receive price 
premiums, the benefits of Fair Trade are not clear-cut. As experienced by the 
interviewed farmers, organic farming has lower yields, especially when higher 
intensity management systems are compared. As a result, price premiums do not 
necessarily lead to higher income compared to alternatives.  
Inequalities in the distribution of value creation are estimated to be higher in 
Fair Trade than conventional coffee in the case of coffee trade from Nicaragua to 
Finland. In absolute terms, Fair Trade has offered slightly higher prices to producer 
organizations particularly when Fair Trade minimum price has exceeded market 
prices. 
In view of the many difficulties coffee production has faced in Nicaragua in 
recent decades, Fair Trade certified cooperatives have been successful. Fair Trade 
can provide financing for development and reduce price risk. However, many other 
risks exist for farmers and cooperatives including loss of crops due to diseases or 
adverse weather conditions. If small-scale coffee production in cooperatives is to 
thrive, well-managed cooperatives and farms are needed. Many Fair Trade certified 
farmers produce low volumes of coffee. While price premiums are welcome, income 
from small quantity of coffee remains meagre. As a result, some Fair Trade farmers 
are trapped in poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
Fair Trade certification sets standards for economic, social, and environmental 
conditions of production and aims to reduce global inequality by increasing prices 
received by farmers in developing countries and by providing financing for 
development projects. Fair Trade endeavors to empower farmers and democratic 
producer organizations, include developing country farmers in a dialogue on 
production conditions, improve labor rights, facilitate access to markets and long-
term trading relationships, and protect the environment by limiting the use of 
agricultural chemicals and encouraging the use of organic production methods 
(Nicholls and Opal, 2005:6,7; Blowfield and Dolan, 2010).  
The objective of this dissertation is to study the opportunities and challenges of 
Fair Trade certification system in altering conditions of coffee production in 
Nicaragua. The aim is to analyze the advantages and constraints of Fair Trade in 
assisting farmers and their cooperatives, involving them in the governance of coffee 
value chains and improving labor conditions. The study highlights the context of 
increased globalization, deregulation of coffee markets and declining and volatile 
coffee prices. 
Coffee production and trade can offer insights into relations between the wealthy 
and the poor, processes of globalization, regulation of agricultural commodity 
markets and new governance mechanisms in the global economy. Daviron and 
Ponte (2005:50) have provided an excellent overview of reasons for this: over 90% 
of the world’s coffee is produced in the global South and coffee is consumed 
predominantly in the global North. Except for periods of extremely low coffee 
prices, coffee has been the second most valuable traded commodity after oil when 
legal exports are considered. For a number of coffee-producing countries, typically 
the least developed ones, coffee represents a large share of their export earnings. 
During much of the 20th century coffee trade was highly regulated by producing 
countries and international agreements. Since the late 1980s, state regulation of 
coffee markets in producing countries has decreased. Finally, during the last two 
decades, coffee has been the center of attention for new forms of regulation such as 
certifications and codes of conduct (Daviron and Ponte, 2005:50).  
Coffee is the flagship product of Fair Trade. The certification system has its 
origins in coffee production and trade, and coffee is the largest Fair Trade product 
by value (VanderHoff Boersma, 2009). Fair Trade certification has expanded in 
recent years to cover a wide range of other products, including tropical fruit, tea, 
spices, wine, flowers, sports balls, and gold. Although academic research on Fair 
Trade has also expanded beyond coffee production, most research until now has 
concentrated on coffee, and this dissertation is no exception (Nelson and Pound, 
2009). Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries among major Fair Trade coffee-
producing countries. It is a country where Fair Trade certification has operated 
since its inception as a formal certification system in the mid-1990s (Levi and 
Linton, 2003: 415– 416). As a major producer of Fair Trade coffee and as a country 
Introduction 
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where 30.5% of the rural population was estimated to live in extreme poverty in 
2005, Nicaragua is a good location for studying the impact of Fair Trade in its aims 
to support disadvantaged cooperatives, farmers, and hired workers (IMF, 2009: 10). 
While the dissertation focuses on Nicaragua, it also studies Fair Trade from 
Nicaragua to Finland. Nicaragua and Finland are small countries by population, but 
fairly “large” coffee-producing and -consuming countries, respectively. For example, 
in 2011, Nicaragua produced and Finland consumed approximately 1.3% and 0.8% 
of the world’s coffee, respectively, while both countries have populations of under 
0.1% of the world’s population (ICO, 2013a and 2013b). This part of the dissertation 
sheds light on how benefits of Fair Trade are distributed between actors in a coffee-
producing and a coffee-consuming country (Article III). 
This dissertation is based on four articles that analyze the following main 
research questions:  
1) What are the impacts of Fair Trade on coffee farmers, cooperatives, and hired 
labor in Nicaragua? How have Nicaraguan coffee cooperatives used the Fair Trade 
social premium to advance their goals and develop coffee-growing communities? 
(Article I) 
2) Given the close relationship between Fair Trade and organically certified 
products, in the case of organically certified Nicaraguan coffee farmers, what are the 
advantages and limitations of Fair Trade in improving the situation of organically 
certified producers? (Article II) 
3) How are the benefits of Fair Trade distributed between different actors in the 
case of coffee trade from Nicaragua to Finland? (Article III) 
4) How do Fair Trade price mechanisms (minimum prices and the premium for 
social development) function in reducing inequalities in coffee production and 
trade? (Article IV) 
Focusing on Nicaragua, the dissertation aims to evaluate the degree to which Fair 
Trade transforms conventional trade relationships into more equitable ones and the 
extent to which Fair Trade involves different actors in governing coffee production 
and trade.  
Some of the issues examined in this dissertation have received relatively little 
attention by other researchers. For example, detailed studies are largely missing on 
the position of hired labor in Fair Trade coffee production, the advantages Fair 
Trade brings to organically certified farmers, and the use of the Fair Trade social 
premium (a part of Fair Trade coffee price that is to be used in developing farmer 
organizations and communities of coffee producers). This dissertation adds to 
knowledge on the possibilities and constraints of Fair Trade to improve conditions 
of production and enhance the position of vulnerable actors, such as farmers and 
workers, in the coffee value chain.  
The synopsis proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
this study. Section 3 describes the context of coffee production and trade globally 
and in Nicaragua. Section 4 provides information on the methods utilized in this 
study and a discussion on research ethics. Section 5 presents the main results of the 
study. Section 6 provides a conclusion. 
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2 Theoretical Underpinnings: Value Chain 
Governance And Convention Theory 
This dissertation concentrates on specific groups of actors in coffee production: 
cooperatives, farmers, and workers in Nicaragua. Because they are part of a global 
production network, it is useful to situate them and Fair Trade to a wider framework 
of developments in the global economy. Theoretical discussions on global value 
chains can offer valuable insights in this respect. As employed by political 
economists and sociologists, value chain analysis has sought to explain how 
production chains (or networks) are governed and how this explains changes in 
patterns in global production, their institutional context, and the power relations in 
which value chains are embedded (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005; Ponte and 
Gibbon, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Raynolds et al., 2007).  
This approach enables us to explore inequalities in production networks and 
how, in the context of rapid globalization, marginalized actors including firms, 
cooperatives, farmers and workers particularly in developing countries could 
improve their position in the chain (Taylor, 2005). As developed by Porter (1985) in 
connection with business studies, value chain analysis was focused on how 
companies could improve their competitiveness by coordinating their activities 
more effectively. More recently, value chain analysis has increasingly focused less on 
the inner operation of a single company and more on the full range of the network of 
activities involved in production (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005).  
Gereffi (1994) employed value chain analysis especially for manufactured goods, 
but his concepts have been developed and applied to agricultural products, such as 
coffee, by other researchers (e.g. Talbot, 1997; Raynolds, 2004; Daviron and Ponte, 
2005). A key concept of value chain analysis is coordination, which refers to non-
market relationships between different actors in value chains and the ability of some 
actors to control information, capabilities, and production processes in the chain. 
Another key concept is upgrading, which refers to abilities to make better products, 
improve processes to make products and develop new functions requiring skills and 
know-how. Upgrading has been seen as a path through which developing country 
actors can improve their position and gain more influence and power in the chain 
(Gereffi, 1994 and 1999). As the position or performance of a value chain actor 
improves through upgrading the rewards increase and/or exposure to risks decrease 
(Riisgaard et al. 2010). Ponte and Ewert (2009:1637) have described a broad 
definition of upgrading as “reaching a better deal”, resembling a Fair Trade slogan 
according to which Fair Trade represents “a better deal for Third World producers”. 
Fair Trade has been used as an example of an upgrading opportunity for developing 
country farmers, ”getting better paid for the same product” as Bolwig et al. (2010: 
177) have argued.  
In the case of coffee production, upgrading could entail controlling information, 
and thus, value of various product qualities and having influence in regulating 
parameters for production, for example certification standards. However, in the case 
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of coffee farmers and cooperatives, gaining certifications and being involved in 
governing them represent only one type of upgrading strategy. Riisgaard et al. 
(2010) identify seven possible upgrading strategies, which can interact and 
influence each other. These can be grouped into three types: 1) the improvement of 
the product, volume or production process, 2) the change and/or the adding of 
functions in the chain, and 3) the improvement of value chain coordination. To 
briefly explain these in the case of coffee farmers and cooperatives, product 
improvements can be achieved through reaching higher quality by, for example, 
meeting quality standards or acquiring certifications such as organic or Fair Trade 
and improving production processes (explained below).  
Production volume can be increased through higher yields and/or greater area 
cultivated, and production process can be improved, for example, through 
increasing efficiency or improved infrastructure. Examples of improved production 
include arranging fertilization and irrigation especially at the end of the dry season 
to ensure the timely “arrival” of the wet season and an optimal supply of nutrients to 
increase yields. Examples of improved infrastructure include obtaining better-
quality facilities for wet-processing, drying, and storage as well as cupping labs for 
quality-control. The change of functions can be either (a) functional upgrading, such 
as taking on new functions such as processing, exporting, roasting or service/input 
provision, or (b) functional downgrading through the abandonment of unprofitable 
activities and a focus on core activities. Vertical value chain coordination can refer to 
improving business ties with buyers through closer and longer relations, contracts 
and personal visits. Coffee value chain actors refer to this by the term “relationship 
coffee”. For producers, this involves learning from buyers about market 
requirements. For coffee buyers in the global North, this provides opportunities to 
learn about the conditions in which coffee is produced and possibilities to fund 
improvements in production. Other possible benefits to cooperatives include a 
reduced price risk, price premiums, lower marketing costs, improved access to 
market information, and credit. Horizontal coordination refers to agreements 
among producers or cooperatives to cooperate, for example, in marketing, crop 
insurance or service/input provision. 
Gereffi (1994) emphasized the central role of lead firms in the power 
relationships between different actors in the value chain. These lead firms can be 
retailers, brand-name companies, industrial processors – such as coffee roasters – 
international traders, or manufacturers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Several 
analysts have argued that as a result of globalization, coffee trade has been 
increasingly dominated by a few large corporations (Talbot, 1997; Ponte, 2002; 
Daviron and Ponte, 2005). Different segments of the chain can be controlled by 
distinct lead firms, especially in agricultural products where vertical integration is 
less common than in manufacturing (Gibbon et al., 2008). The large volumes traded 
by these lead firms give them a great deal of power in determining various 
parameters of production processes. These include 1) what is produced, 2) how it is 
produced (definition of production processes such as environmental and labor 
conditions, quality systems and technologies used), 3) when it is produced (just-in-
time delivery), and 4) where it is produced (geographical location and re-location of 
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production activities) (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). The decisions taken by lead 
firms can thus greatly influence developing country coffee farmers and laborers. The 
concentration of power to an ever-smaller number of large and growing 
corporations has coincided with reduced government control of coffee-producing 
activities.  
Gereffi (1994) introduced the concept of producer-driven versus buyer-driven 
chains. The difference between the two types of chains lies in the types of barriers to 
entry. In producer-driven chains, large corporations have a central role in 
coordinating production networks in capital-intensive fields requiring a high degree 
of know-how, for example in car manufacturing. Geographically, the production 
network is varied and includes countries with different levels of development. 
Buyer-driven chains are those where large retailers, brand-name owners, and 
trading companies have a central role in driving geographically-dispersed 
production, which is often labor-intensive and increasingly takes place in developing 
countries and particularly in so-called emerging economies. In the buyer-driven 
chain, innovation lies more in product design and marketing than in manufacturing 
know-how, and it is relatively easy for lead firms to outsource production and switch 
between producers to locate the least expensive suppliers. Examples of this type of 
activities are garments, footwear, and consumer electronics, but also tropical 
agricultural products such as coffee. 
 Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) also identified key factors in value chain 
governance. Firms can influence market access and thus the position of, for 
example, small-scale farmers and whether these are marginalized from or involved 
in the global markets. Lead firms can support producers by providing fast track 
acquisition of production capabilities. For example, they can provide hands-on 
advice to improve practices and raise skills. Governments have often taken great 
interest in coffee production and trade. As a result of economic liberalization and 
increased corporate power, companies have to some degree taken the role that was 
formerly mainly held by state agencies in providing production capabilities through, 
for instance, credit and training.  
Another key governance issue is the distribution of gains in the value chain. 
Kaplinsky (2000) suggested that the locus of power in buyer-driven chains lies not 
with the material production but with design, branding, marketing, and retailing, 
which are characterized by high barriers to entry and provide high returns. In coffee 
value chains these activities are usually controlled by firms in developed countries, 
while actors in developing countries producing coffee are locked into activities 
characterized by low barriers to entry and reap low returns. Fair Trade can be 
viewed as a response to this, attempting to increase returns to farmers and giving 
them a higher share of the value created by their branded product. By certifying only 
cooperatives of small-scale farmers in the case of coffee and providing them with 
financing for developing their activities, Fair Trade aims to support the production 
capabilities of marginalized actors, who are less likely to be targeted by development 
efforts of companies.  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) further argue that governance of global value 
chains can both undermine government policy and offer new leverage for 
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government initiatives. For example, lead firms can influence the raising of labor 
and environmental standards of their suppliers. On the other hand, the opposite is 
also possible. Lowering of standards could result from intense competition and 
pressures for low-cost production. The value chain further provides the possibility 
to function as a funnel for technical assistance. Since a network exists that connects 
lead firms to a large number of producers in developing countries, this network 
could potentially be utilized to assist farmers to improve their farming practices or 
export capabilities. Fair Trade is increasingly taking itself multiple roles as not only 
a certification system, but also development organization funded by governments 
across the globe by official development assistance funds.  
The degree to which a given value chain is controlled by a lead firm and other 
actors has been called drivenness. This has been described as a wide spectrum 
between hands-on and hands-off drivenness. Hands-on drivenness is characterized 
by long-term contracts and explicit control of suppliers resembling the managerial 
control inside a firm. Hands-off drivenness is characterized by the use of 
specifications, such as codes of conduct, standards, and certifications, which can be 
audited and measured through third parties (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). 
Increased globalization has led to intensification of corporate control in the 
economy. Companies are increasingly re-locating production to developing 
countries, where legal standards for production conditions are often weaker than in 
developed countries. In the case of agricultural products from developing countries, 
there is a more explicit coordination of production by retail chains, which aim to 
control different product qualities (Freidberg, 2003a). As the power of corporations 
has increased, so have criticisms by social movements and NGOs gained momentum 
as a counterweight to corporate power. Global markets connect us more closely than 
ever, but it is widely held that existing national and international institutions are 
unwilling or unable to adequately regulate conditions of production globally (Börzel 
and Risse, 2010). As a result, “private authority” has gained prominence as part of 
globalization processes. This rule-making by civil societies and companies has 
addressed labor practices, environmental performance, human rights policies, and 
various other political and economic issues. One phenomenon that has resulted 
from this emergence of private authority is a proliferation of certification systems 
and codes of conduct also in coffee production and trade (Muradian and Pelupessy, 
2005; Vogel, 2010).  
Islam (2008) has proposed that some value chains are “twin-driven”, where in 
addition to companies civil society coordinates production processes. For example, 
environmental organizations and certification systems participate in establishing 
norms for production conditions. This view resembles the wider theories in social 
sciences on governance, which is seen as an exercise where many different actors in 
addition to governmental institutions participate in establishing rules, norms, and 
regulatory processes (Hoffmann and Ba, 2005: 1–14). These actors include, as in the 
twin-driven value chain by Islam (2008), private sector actors, such as companies, 
public sector actors, such as governments and international organizations, and third 
sector representatives, such as consumer or environmental organizations, all of 
which influence each other in their interaction.  
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Raynolds (2012) has argued that in the case of Fair Trade “social regulation” 
would be a more appropriate term than private regulation, as public and private 
usually refer to state and corporate actors, respectively, and in the case of Fair Trade 
a number of actors participate in embedding market relations socially.  The goal of 
these various actors in value chain governance is to raise the bar of standards of 
production above the requirements of the public sector, which is often seen as 
lagging behind in the legal control of activities. This “soft law” with elevated 
standards does not have the force of a formal “hard law” and its sanctions, but it 
may have other enforcement mechanisms, such as admission to markets, as in the 
case of certified coffee production (Abbot and Snidal, 2000; Hall and Biersteker, 
2002; Raynolds et al., 2007a).  
The various actors participating in governing conditions of production can 
complement each other, but they also duplicate each other’s work and compete with 
each other for attention and resources. Private governance systems are more diverse 
than public ones and “involve multiple actors in new roles and relationships, 
experimenting with new processes of standard setting, monitoring, benchmarking, 
and enforcement” (O’Rourke, 2003:5).  As an example of the negative consequences 
of this, Stigzelius and Mark-Herbert (2009) argue that suppliers can be in a complex 
and burdensome situation where they have to meet standards set by many actors 
and inspections by many different auditors. In creating standards and implementing 
them, some actors tend to exercise greater power and control than others involved 
in governing value chains. Standards are often implemented in a top-down manner 
with little understanding of their purpose among suppliers and factory/farm 
workers. The ability of auditors in determining conditions of production during brief 
visits can be questioned, which undermines the rationale for the entire exercise of 
establishing certifications and codes of conduct.  
As corporate power and criticism of corporations have increased, there has been 
a rise in corporate responsibility and “an ethical turn” in business practices 
(Freidberg, 2003a). Companies are increasingly interested in claiming that the 
products they sell have been produced respecting the rights of workers and 
sustaining the environmental good, and are willing to provide evidence for this. 
Companies increasingly realize that their markets are socially embedded and made 
up of customers, including those who care about conditions of production. 
Companies are thus concerned about the possibility for a tarnished image if 
indecent working conditions or environmentally detrimental practices are exposed 
by “naming and shaming practices” of NGOs. Bringing about this type of damage to 
a brand image has become far easier than it used to be as a result of recent 
improvements in communication technologies and ease of international travel. 
From the point of view of companies, corporate responsibility can thus be viewed as 
a possibility to differentiate their products as “ethical” and/or a risk-management 
strategy. Investors increasingly demand companies to provide information on an 
annual basis on how the companies are addressing environmental, social, and 
governance risks. The view that companies are responsible not only to their 
shareholders but also to other constituencies is gaining ground. All this requires that 
companies actually know what is taking place in their supply chains. Before they can 
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do so, they also have to know where their products come from, and as a result 
companies are interested in achieving an improved traceability of products and their 
raw materials as well as a greater influence in coordinating activities along the value 
chain. Contributing to governance, which raises environmental and social regulation 
beyond legal requirements, has become a matter of self-interest to companies (Blair 
et al., 2008; Blowfield and Murray, 2008; Börzel and Risse, 2010).  
This context partly explains the interest of companies in participating in Fair 
Trade, which enables them improve their image as socially responsible actors and 
provide their customers with products certified to exceed regular standards in 
production processes. Raynolds (2012) argues that companies differ in their 
approach to Fair Trade. For some, Fair Trade represents an alternative trade model 
they intend to pursue and promote, but particularly for large corporations Fair 
Trade is mostly another market niche where they see potential for growth. 
Value chain analysis can be complemented by convention theory, which has its 
origins in work by researchers who analyzed particularly French agriculture and 
food industries (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991; Allaire and Boyer, 1995; Eymard-
Duvernay, 1995; Sylvander, 1995; Thévenot, 1995). Later, the convention approach 
has been applied to global agricultural production and trade (Murdoch et al., 2000; 
Raynolds, 2004; Daviron and Ponte, 2005). According to Eymard-Duvernay (1995), 
standardization of products leads to lower prices enabled by economies of scale. The 
opposite is the case with a branded product, which does not aim to be a standard 
product, instead having improved qualities and a higher price. Convention theory 
focuses on qualities of products, which are not always immediately obvious or 
universally recognized.  Conventions help to market qualities that consumers would 
be unable to detect without the information provided by these conventions. In the 
case of coffee, a wide array of actors involved in coffee trade, including NGOs and 
consumers, requires more information on the ethical, environmental, and 
socioeconomic aspects of coffee production such as fair prices for producers and 
decent labor conditions (Goodman, 2003; Barrientos and Dolan, 2006). 
In addition to the recent “ethical turn”, a “quality turn” has taken place in 
production and consumption (Freidberg, 2003a). Since there are no “objective” or 
universal qualities, these are constructed and as a result quality depends on how the 
actors involved view them. More precisely, quality depends on buyers’ acceptance of 
the value assigned to a particular quality and the reliability of the convention used to 
assure it (Murdoch et al., 2000; Freidberg, 2003b). An example of this kind of 
quality is “local food”. Certain consumers would accept that food that has been 
produced near where it is consumed is of higher quality and may be less harmful 
environmentally because the food reaches consumers fast or travels less. Consumers 
need some type of assurance of the vicinity of the production process, which 
typically is based on trust of the information provided by the seller.  
According to some convention typologies, four different conventions can be 
distinguished; these are not mutually exclusive and can overlap and compete with 
each other. 1) Market conventions are based on price. There is no uncertainty about 
quality, and differences in price express known differences in quality. 2) Domestic 
conventions are based on trust. Examples include long-term relationships between 
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buyers and sellers, brands, or labels of origin. 3) Industrial conventions are based 
on efficiency and reliability linked to formal testing and standards such as 
certifications. 4) Civic conventions are based on evaluations of general societal 
benefits such as social or environmental impacts of products (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 1991; Allaire and Boyer, 1995).  
Combining ideas of value chain governance and convention theory, Ponte and 
Gibbon (2005) have argued that in terms of value creation the central issue is how 
lead firms define and manage quality. This management of quality can lead to 
competition and/or cooperation between different actors in a value chain, each 
actor having only partial access to and control of information on various product 
qualities. As an example of cooperation, producer organizations, traders, and 
roasters can join their forces in marketing coffee as having attributes that 
consumers consider socially and environmentally desirable, such as coffee having 
been produced by cooperatives of small-scale farmers or women organizations, and 
environmentally beneficial production practices, such as high floristic diversity in 
shade trees.  
Fair Trade is an example of blurring of boundaries between the conventions 
described above. “Civic content” in the form of social and environmental guarantees 
of the production process is important for Fair Trade, which is also a form of 
bringing producers and consumers closer (a domestic convention). As a certification 
system, Fair Trade represents an industrial convention and some mainstream actors 
seem to participate in Fair Trade mainly in terms of market conventions (Freidberg, 
2003a; Raynolds, 2004; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). Fair Trade has been welcomed 
as a system that increases information on the conditions of production and re-
embeds social relations to trade by removing the veil of exploitative social and 
economic relationships in capitalist commodity production (Hudson and Hudson, 
2003). On the other hand, the information provided by Fair Trade to consumers 
regarding how it benefits farmers and workers is incomplete (Article III). This has 
resulted in some researchers calling certifications a form of “double fetishism” 
because the social relations between producers and consumers are only apparently 
unveiled, but in reality they are not made very transparent (Freidberg, 2003a). The 
information conveyed through conventions, such as certification systems, is 
effective only if consumers trust in them. As a result, providing stories and images of 
satisfied farmers and workers participating in Fair Trade has become a central 
activity of the social movement promoting Fair Trade (Goodman, 2004). 
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3 The Context of Regulating Coffee 
Production and Trade Globally and in 
Nicaragua 
3.1 The Global Context 
Global coffee markers have been subject to many interventions and relatively 
effective regulation during much of the 20th century. This can offer lessons for Fair 
Trade as it endeavors to achieve similar goals in stabilizing and increasing prices to 
farmers. From the early 20th century until 1989, government interventions 
attempted to do the same, primarily by limiting exports and controlling stocks. As 
the largest coffee producing-country, Brazil was especially influential in this respect, 
and in the early part of the 20th century, it attempted to control prices through 
unilateral actions, including some drastic efforts such as destroying millions of bags 
of coffee in the 1930s (Raffaelli, 1995: 35). International interventions also took 
place, aimed at stabilizing commodity prices. In 1940, the Inter-American Coffee 
Agreement was signed between the U.S. and Latin American coffee-producing 
countries. The agreement aimed at limiting production by distribution of export 
quotas to North America (Raffaelli, 1995: 34–37; Daviron and Ponte, 2005:84–86).  
After World War II, a series of negotiations took place in United Nations forums, 
with the objective of creating commodity agreements that would prevent extreme 
highs and lows in commodity markets. Since every commodity was different, they 
needed to be dealt with case by case. Commodity agreements made for the following 
products were especially important for developing countries: coffee (1962–1989), 
cocoa (1972–1988), rubber (1980–?), sugar (1954–1983), and tin (1954–1982) 
(Raffaelli, 1995; Gilbert, 1996). Only some of the agreements included export 
controls or price ranges. The International Coffee Agreement introduced an implicit 
target price range for coffee at 115–150 U.S. cents per pound from 1981. Export 
quotas were allocated to producer countries, which in turn distributed export 
permits to coffee producers. Quotas were not constantly enforced, but were 
introduced when coffee price was low (Gilbert, 1996). Some international 
commodity agreements continue to exist, including the International Coffee 
Agreement, but they are no longer market interventions, but can be characterized as 
development programs. 
In the 1970s, the example of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) showed developing countries that limiting commodity production can 
raise prices. Commodity-producing developing countries saw international 
commodity agreements as possibilities to provide financing for development and as 
a cornerstone of the New International Economic Order (Gilbert, 1996). There are, 
however, differences between OPEC and commodity agreements. OPEC is a cartel, 
where producing countries unilaterally restrict supply, whereas commodity 
agreements included both producing and consuming countries in their negotiations. 
Petroleum, unlike tropical agricultural products, is difficult to replace in short to 
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medium term. One could argue that coffee comes close to being a necessity in 
Northern societies. However, coffee production could be substantially expanded in a 
country not participating in a cartel.  
The International Coffee Agreements succeeded in raising and possibly 
stabilizing prices, which still remained volatile. Its success relative to other 
commodity agreements resulted especially from the participation of all major 
producing and consuming countries. Even the most reluctant country to control 
commodity prices, the United States, participated and was motivated to do so by its 
desire to have friends in Latin America during the Cold War (Raffaelli, 1995: 48–
50).  
However, the system was far from perfect and its problems became increasingly 
apparent towards the late 1980s. Gilbert (1996) lists reasons why attempts to 
control supply were eventually discontinued. Supply restrictions tend to encourage 
production by non-members as well as non-compliance by members. Excess coffee 
could be sold to countries that were not members of the agreement. This led to 
lower coffee prices for non-member consuming countries. Roasters in member 
consuming countries had to pay a higher price and were unable to freely switch 
between the type of coffee and the origin they wanted. “Tourist coffee” would travel 
through non-member countries to member countries to avoid the quota system. 
Coffee producers did not always see the benefits of higher coffee prices, which, from 
their perspective, were reaped by government agencies controlling coffee trade. 
There were disagreements among producer countries over how production quotas 
should be distributed. With new producer countries emerging, it was increasingly 
complicated to allocate production quotas and to police the implementation of the 
scheme. The system did not have mechanisms for revising the price range. Changes 
in costs of production and consumer tastes, for example, could rapidly change 
demand of certain types of coffee and the level of prices. A downward revision of 
prices was unpopular among producing countries. As Gilbert concludes (1996:1): 
“commodity control fits uneasily in an increasingly globalized and competitive 
world, and this perception has resulted in a diminished willingness to resolve the 
practical difficulties of price stabilization.” The Brazilian government was undecided 
on a new coffee agreement, while the U.S. government was opposed to it. These 
developments led to the demise of the International Coffee Agreements with their 
export controls. 
Another possibility for price stabilization is maintaining buffer stocks, i.e. 
storing coffee during periods of oversupply and low prices. However, oversupply can 
last for a long time and maintaining stocks involves high capital costs. Although 
green coffee can be stored for up to a year, quality does deteriorate with time. 
Additionally, knowledge of the existence of stocks can depress prices, questioning 
the logic of maintaining stocks to increase prices in the first place (Gilbert, 1996).  
Until the 1980s, many coffee-producing countries had influential organizations 
of coffee producers, which controlled exports, sometimes bought coffee to stabilize 
prices, and provided extension services, inputs, and credit. Additionally, many 
countries had coffee marketing boards, which intervened in markets to stabilize 
prices and collected state revenue as a type of taxation. However, in many cases, 
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state involvement in coffee markets was notorious for corruption. In most countries, 
the organizations of coffee producers lost much of their influence, and the coffee 
marketing boards were dismantled (Daviron and Ponte, 2005:95, 96).    
The end of the International Coffee Agreements as market interventions and the 
diminished state involvement in coffee markets took place in the wider context of 
increased trade, decreased barriers to trade, advanced communication technologies, 
and declining transportation costs, which accelerated the processes of globalization.  
As a backdrop to these developments were the end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of the neoliberal project epitomized by the “Washington Consensus” 
among Western governments and multilateral financial institutions. These 
promoted development strategies based on the deregulation of markets and 
privatization and liberalization of international trade. This undermined the ability of 
coffee producing-countries to regulate coffee markets and to collect state revenue 
from coffee exports (Daviron and Ponte, 2005: 83–126; Goodman, 2008). Free 
markets led to improved price transmission of international coffee prices to farmers, 
but exposed them more to price volatility (Krivonos, 2004). 
Another explanation that has been offered for the powerless situation of coffee 
farmers is the oligopsonic market conditions where few actors control trade and 
roasting (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005). However, the situation is complex. 
During recent decades the coffee value chains have consolidated and fragmented 
simultaneously. The supply of coffee has increasingly fragmented with new coffee-
producing countries entering the market. The largest actors in importing, roasting, 
and retailing have increased their shares in coffee trade, while new niche markets of 
specialty coffees have simultaneously emerged (Daviron and Ponte, 2005:90–93). 
While consolidation of coffee trade has occurred, liberalization of markets has led to 
increased competition, reducing the ability of individual actors to exercise market 
power. In individual countries or regions, monopolistic conditions of coffee buying 
may occur, but this is increasingly rare due to market liberalization.  
Coffee prices behave much like those of many other commodities, with wide 
price swings during a shortage or oversupply (or expectation of these). Occasionally, 
seemingly small changes drastically alter the balance of supply and demand. In tree 
crops, excess capacity can persist for several years after prices fall. This is because 
once the crop has been established and is producing even when the market price is 
below the total costs of production, it can be above the variable costs (primarily 
harvesting, processing, and minimal care of the crops), resulting in supply in the 
market by producers whose total costs of production are not covered (Daviron and 
Ponte, 2005:110–113). Low prices will result in low investment and over time this 
leads to prices that are closer to costs of production. After the collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement in 1989, coffee prices fell markedly (Raffaelli, 
1995:73). This led to negotiations by producing countries to limit exports. In 1994, 
the Association of Coffee-Producing Countries was formed with the intention of 
increasing prices by limiting exports. Coffee prices did rise, but they rose primarily 
as a result of severe frosts and drought in Brazil in 1994 and a speculative hike in 
1997 (Daviron and Ponte, 2005:88, 89). These higher prices in the mid-1990s 
fuelled a coffee boom in Vietnam, where market liberalization led to policies to 
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expand agricultural exports, including coffee. This period of slightly higher prices in 
the mid-1990s postponed the effects of deregulation and liberalization of markets to 
the early 2000s, when the lowest coffee prices in history were recorded. In 2001, the 
Association of Coffee-Producing Countries admitted that it was unable to restrict 
coffee supply (Daviron and Ponte, 2005:89).  
In 2002, coffee prices reached their 100-year lows, causing serious problems for 
coffee farmers and coffee-dependent economies worldwide (ICO, 2003). Since the 
end of 2004, prices have risen steadily, reaching particularly high levels in 2010 and 
2011. In real terms, the highest prices in 14 years were reached in 2011 (ICO, 2011a). 
At the same time, productivity has increased through high-yield coffee varieties, 
higher intensity farming, and some mechanization of production, especially in the 
largest coffee-producing country, Brazil (Gilbert, 2006).  
In this context of reduced state regulation of coffee markets, volatile coffee 
prices, increased globalization, calls for corporate responsibility and higher quality, 
and the drastic economic and social consequences of low coffee prices, certification 
systems and codes of conduct for coffee production have proliferated. Some of the 
major initiatives include Fair Trade (operated as Max Havelaar certification in the 
Netherlands since 1988), organically certified, Rainforest Alliance (1996), Utz 
Certified (1997), and the Common Code for the Coffee Community (2003). As a 
result of these developments, coffee markets are increasingly differentiated based on 
various physical qualities and increasingly also on social and environmental 
responsibility features (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005). Fair Trade has been 
considered to stand out among these major certification systems and codes of 
conduct as one with the highest standards (Raynolds et al., 2007a). Table 1 
summarizes major requirements of Fair Trade for certified producers and licensed 
importers. Fair Trade is also set apart from most other certification systems by 
having originated from and being supported by a global social movement. In coffee-
consuming countries, the Fair Trade system comprises 19 national Fair Trade 
organizations covering 24 countries (FLO, 2012a).  These are backed by civil 
societies in their respective countries. For example, in Finland, the national Fair 
Trade organization is supported by 30 Finnish NGOs (Reilun kaupan 
edistämisyhdistys, 2012). 
  
Table 1. Fair Trade standards for coffee in a nutshell (summarizing a 22-page 
document: FLO, 2005) 
Certified producers must: 
Be members of democratically organized 
cooperatives 
Follow norms created by ILO 
(International Labor Organization) 
Follow environmental standards 
Licensed importers must: 
Have long-term contracts with producer 
organizations 
Offer credit to producer organizations 
Pay minimum prices plus a social 
premium 
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Marked similarities exist between Fair Trade certification and the International 
Coffee Agreements prior to the 1990s in their aims to increase coffee prices to 
benefit producers. Even the nominal price level is similar, which is the result of Fair 
Trade inheriting the price level at which the International Coffee Agreements aimed 
to keep prices in the 1980s (Bacon, 2010a).  
Some differences exist as well. The International Coffee Agreements aimed to 
regulate the entire global production and trade or at least the majority of it, whereas 
Fair Trade exists as a niche market parallel to conventional trade. The International 
Coffee Agreements attempted to raise prices by limiting production, while Fair 
Trade sets minimum prices. Fair Trade also sets standards for conditions of 
production, for example labor standards. Fair Trade can be viewed as a system that 
sets a higher standard for production and provides financing and incentives to 
farmers and cooperatives for meeting these standards. Other certification systems 
have been criticized for lacking such compensation mechanisms that would provide 
motivation for implementing practices exceeding local norms (Raynolds et al., 
2007a; Stigzelius and Mark-Herbert, 2009).  
Additionally, Fair Trade provides financing for development through its social 
premium. Assessing the performance of Fair Trade is complicated by the multiple 
roles it has taken: Fair Trade is simultaneously a social movement and a 
certification system, an expression of solidarity providing higher than market prices 
to poor farmers, a compensation for meeting higher standards in production, a 
system providing financing for development projects and a development 
organization financed by official development assistance funds of governments.  
3.2 Coffee Production and Trade in Nicaragua 
The Somoza family ruled Nicaragua as dictators from the 1930s until 1979. They 
treated the state as their personal possession and limited political freedoms 
(Enríquez, 1997). The authoritarian state was legitimatized by the need to keep the 
communists from taking power. The gross domestic product rose on average an 
impressive 3.9% between 1962 and 1971 as a result of industrialization and 
expansion of export agriculture (Booth et al., 2006:72). However, the Somoza 
regime repressed unions and kept wages low, preventing the benefits of economic 
expansion from reaching the oversupplied laborers. This resulted in high income 
inequality. The dictatorship ended in 1979 with the Sandinista revolution (Paige, 
1997:280). The Sandinistas inherited a host of grave problems from the previous 
regime. These included 1.6 billion dollars of international debt as well as problems 
in public health, housing, education, and nutrition all exacerbated by war. Despite 
these problems, the Sandinistas built a new governmental system, reactivated, at 
least initially, the economy and implemented numerous social and educational 
programs, including improved health services and literacy campaigns (Paige, 
1997:280; Booth et al., 2006:72–82).  
The Somoza family had owned approximately 25% of land, which the 
Sandinistas confiscated, turning them into state farms and cooperatives. However, 
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land ownership was unequal more broadly. In 1981, 1.2% of the population owned 
47.1% of the land and 30% of the rural population did not own any land (Paige, 
1997: 277). In a process of land reforms, the Sandinista government confiscated 
lands that were underutilized or owned by dissident members of the agroindustrial 
elite and distributed these to more than 100,000 peasant families (Paige, 1997: 277; 
Rocha, 2003: 71, 72). Encouraging coffee production was one of the priorities of the 
Sandinista government, which received a large part of its export earnings from 
coffee, which enjoyed relatively high international prices in the 1980s. The share of 
coffee exports of all Nicaraguan exports ranged between 27% and 44% in 1980–1987 
(Rocha, 2003: 71, 72). 
Despite the establishment of state farms and cooperatives during the Sandinista 
period, most of the coffee in the country continued to be produced by private farms. 
The coffee-farming bourgeoisie initially supported the revolution, which they hoped 
would bring them the political freedoms they had lacked. Over time, coffee farmers 
became disillusioned with the Sandinistas, who limited the economic freedoms they 
had previously had under the Somoza dictatorship. The coffee market was tightly 
controlled and most farmers believed that the Sandinistas were working on turning 
Nicaragua into Cuban and Soviet style communism, which would mean confiscation 
of their land at some point. Export products were sold to government trading boards 
at fixed prices. It was difficult or impossible to obtain imported agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizers (Paige, 1997).  
Paige (1997:287) estimates that in 1986 coffee growers in Nicaragua received 
only 10% of the international market price of coffee, while the government market 
board retained 90%, effectively as a huge export tax.  This would have eliminated 
any incentive to produce coffee, but it was offset by price controls of other factors of 
production enabling farmers to continue producing. For example, the state provided 
credit to coffee farmers with negative interest rates in real terms (Rocha, 2003). 
There was a shortage of all critical items needed in agriculture and excessive black 
market prices for them. Most coffee farmers saw no point in investing in their farms 
because they believed their lands would be taken away (Paige, 1997).  
Another critical problem for farmers was lack of labor. This was attributed to the 
contra war, which took many men to the army and made coffee work dangerous, as 
the areas of coffee production were hard hit by the war. The contras sought to 
paralyze the Nicaraguan economy by targeting coffee laborers. Another reason for 
the lack of labor was a dysfunctional labor market. The low level of salaries set by 
the government did not encourage taking employment, and due to low prices 
received by farmers they were unable to pay higher salaries. Coffee harvesting is 
labor intensive, and if labor is not available, coffee cherries will rot in the trees and 
on the ground. The Sandinista government organized volunteer labor to coffee 
farms, and as a gesture of international solidarity volunteers from all over the world 
came to Nicaragua to volunteer in coffee harvesting (Paige, 1997; Rocha, 2003). 
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Picture 1 A mural in the town of Jinotega showing coffee harvesting during the civil 
war. 
The Sandinistas gained friends from the beneficiaries of land reforms, but made 
enemies of those who lost their lands. The agroindustrial elite, including owners of 
coffee estates, increasingly sympathized with the contras and hoped for the United 
States to intervene militarily in Nicaragua. The United States and its Reagan 
administration viewed Nicaragua in terms of its Cold War confrontation with the 
Soviet Union. The U.S. support to the contras pushed the Sandinistas further into 
the arms of the Soviet Union, as they became increasingly dependent on the Soviet 
military aid. Towards the end of the 1980s, the economy of Nicaragua collapsed as a 
result of civil war, the U.S.-imposed trade embargo, and problems related to 
reforming agriculture. By then, the Nicaraguan economy was characterized by a 
massive foreign debt and hyperinflation. The Sandinistas responded to this by 
introducing structural reforms limiting government spending (Enríquez, 1997; 
Paige, 1997).  
After the Sandinistas lost in elections in 1990, the Chamorro administration 
embraced neoliberal policies of privatizing government properties, cutting public 
expenditure, and lowering tariffs. The economy stagnated and ordinary Nicaraguans 
suffered from lack of basic services, but hyperinflation ended, modest economic 
growth started after 1996, and reconciliation ended atrocities (Booth et al., 2006:85, 
86). The government abandoned the control of coffee exports. After the government 
stopped subsidizing coffee cooperatives in 1990, most cooperatives collapsed. The 
Sandinista land reforms had created a large base of small-scale coffee farmers in the 
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main coffee-producing regions in Matagalpa and Jinotega. Since the mid-1990s 
some cooperatives started to reorganize themselves around the idea of defending 
their lands received in land reforms. To improve their position in the coffee value 
chain, they sought new partnerships through socially responsible businesses (Bacon, 
2010b). Supported by international NGOs and development cooperation, 
cooperatives established links to specialty markets including Fair Trade. 
Organizations such as Cooperative League United States supported many farmers 
who sought to gain organic certification to reach higher value markets (Valkila, 
2010).  
Analysts of the global coffee value chains often point out that state marketing 
boards and international coffee agreements guaranteed coffee farmers a larger share 
of retail prices of coffee before the liberalization of markets in the 1990s (Talbot, 
1997; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005). Obviously, the Nicaraguan case is different 
due to in many ways chaotic situation the country was in during the 1980s and the 
heavy government control of coffee trade, which was utilized to finance the state. 
Coffee farming survived this difficult period, although production declined during 
the 1980s (Rocha, 2003). Liberalization of the economy in Nicaragua since 1990 led 
to a situation where government support to cooperatives and farmers is negligible. 
Coffee farmers in Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, or Mexico enjoy better government 
services, including credit, extension, subsidies, and market support as well as better 
infrastructure and a higher level of education. Nicaragua also does not have a 
functioning national coffee institution (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2013). In addition to 
political turmoil, Nicaraguan coffee production suffered from a series of other 
shocks. Hurricane Mitch paralyzed the country in 1998, there was a severe drought 
in 1999–2001, and coffee prices were extremely low in 2000–2004 (Bacon, 
2005:502).    
Rocha (2003) provides an overview of developments in Nicaraguan coffee 
production since the early 1980s. Nicaraguan coffee exports reached a peak of 
54,545 tons in 1983. By 1989, exports had descended to 26,599 tons. Coffee 
production by cooperatives reached 40% of production in Nicaragua in 1989. This 
high share was partly explained by the collapse of coffee production on private 
farms. Since 1990, the state has intervened in coffee markets only minimally. After 
20 years of liberalized coffee markets, total green coffee exports reached 101,962 
tons in 2010. In proportion to its population, Nicaragua produced roughly the same 
amount of coffee in 1983 and 2010, as both the population of Nicaragua and its 
coffee exports have roughly doubled in this time period (Rocha, 2003; CETREX, 
2011a). According to government statistics (CETREX, 2011a), the value of coffee 
exports from Nicaragua were 342 million U.S. dollars in 2010. This represented 18% 
of all Nicaraguan exports. A total of 69 companies and cooperatives exported coffee 
from Nicaragua in 2010. Two of the largest export companies, Cisa Exportadora and 
Exportadora Atlantic, exported 52% of all Nicaraguan coffee by volume. 
Cooperatives exported approximately 20% of all coffee (CETREX, 2011a; Mendoza 
et al., 2011). Approximately 17,000 coffee farmers are members of cooperatives 
(Mendoza et al., 2011). CAFENICA is an umbrella organization for Nicaraguan 
cooperatives, consisting of 11,500 farmer members. Of these farmers, 28% are 
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women (Mendoza et al., 2011). Table 2 presents the main destinations of Nicaraguan 
coffee exports in 2009–2010. Most coffee is exported to wealthy Northern countries 
and Nicaragua’s close ally Venezuela. 
 
Table 2. Principal destinations of Nicaraguan green coffee exports in 2009–
2010 (thousands of kilograms) (Source: CETREX, 2011b). 
United States 44,970 
Venezuela 7,840 
Belgium 6,370 
Spain 6,240 
Germany 5,770 
Finland 5,220 
Canada 4,460 
Italy 3,520 
Sweden 3,460 
Japan 2,750  
 
Coffee is produced in Nicaragua both on small farms and on large coffee estates. 
Although recent statistics are not available regarding different types of coffee 
farmers, data from 2000/2001 indicate that a large number of small-scale coffee 
farmers exist in Nicaragua. In 2000/2001, there were approximately 48,000 coffee 
farmers, and 80% of these were small producers with less than 3.5 ha of coffee in 
cultivation. Despite the vast number of microproducers, farms larger than 3.5 ha 
produced more than 85% of the Nicaraguan coffee harvest. The largest 400 farms 
produced approximately 36% of Nicaraguan coffee. These farms covered 12% of the 
coffee farming area (Flores et al., 2002: Annex). Approximately 280,000 people, 
representing 42% of the economically active rural labor force in Nicaragua, derived 
at least part of their annual income from coffee production (Flores et al., 2002: 14). 
Nicaraguan coffee production takes place in a context of heterogeneous coffee 
farms. During recent decades there have been major political upheavals and related 
changes in production and trade. Liberalization of coffee production and trade has 
occurred in a context of high fluctuations in international coffee prices. The coffee 
crisis in 2000–2004 had a dramatic impact on coffee-dependent rural areas, where 
poverty was widespread even without the effect of low international coffee prices 
(Bacon, 2005). In this challenging environment coffee certification systems such as 
Fair Trade have become one of the many new institutions governing coffee 
production and trade. 
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4 Research Methods  
4.1 Methods 
Approximately 78% of Nicaraguan coffee is produced in the adjacent departments of 
Jinotega and Matagalpa, where average yields are higher than elsewhere in 
Nicaragua and the altitude (mostly between 900 and 1400 meters above sea level) is 
ideal for coffee (IICA, 2003: 53, 54). Most Fair Trade certified cooperatives in 
Nicaragua are located in these departments and the adjacent departments of Las 
Segovias, and Boaco.  For this study, farmers and administrators of 11 coffee 
cooperatives and unions of cooperatives were interviewed in the departments of 
Jinotega, Matagalpa, Boaco and Las Segovias. These cooperatives varied from 
organizations of a few dozen producers to unions of cooperatives containing more 
than 2,000 members. Four of the cooperatives had been Fair Trade certified since 
the mid-1990s, five had received certification in the early 2000s, and two were in 
the process of becoming Fair Trade certified. The study therefore includes 
cooperatives of different sizes, with varying lengths of experience with Fair Trade.  
Initially the plan was to include fewer cooperatives in the study, but during 
fieldwork it became evident that cooperatives differ significantly from one another 
in size, length of involvement in Fair Trade, organic certification (some Fair Trade 
certified cooperatives produce only organically certified coffee, while others produce 
a small percentage as organically certified), and proportion of production sold as 
Fair Trade certified. A plan to include a larger number of cooperatives was devised 
during fieldwork because it became apparent that the experiences of cooperatives 
and farmers producing organically certified coffee, for example, differed from those 
cooperatives where few farmers were organically certified.  
In March 2005 and from September 2005 through February 2006, I conducted 
semistructured interviews with a total of 110 coffee producers involved in 
cooperatives. Of these producers, 94 belonged to a Fair Trade certified cooperative 
and 16 were members of cooperatives that were in the process of becoming Fair 
Trade certified.1 The experiences of these 16 farmers from two cooperatives were 
useful for understanding the situation of cooperatives and farmers who already have 
organic certification and seek Fair Trade certification. In addition, I interviewed 10 
producers who had been members of a Fair Trade certified cooperative but who had 
withdrawn due to better terms of trade elsewhere. Their experiences were useful for 
understanding why some farmers prefer to deal with export companies rather than 
Fair Trade certified cooperatives. Approximately 10 farmers were interviewed from 
each cooperative. I selected the informants based on the criteria that in each 
                                                
1 About 65% of these farmers also had an organic certification for their coffee. The same 
situation characterizes Fair Trade coffee producers worldwide; approximately 50% of Fair 
Trade certified coffee is also organically certified (Meyer, 2005). 
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cooperative both larger (>3.5 ha) and smaller (<3.5 ha) producers and both men 
and women would be represented. I received information from cooperatives 
regarding their members and based on this information selected coffee-producing 
regions to visit. These were typically prime coffee-producing areas. Most Fair Trade 
coffee farmers in Nicaragua produce coffee in these areas, where most conventional 
coffee farming also takes place. The selection process of farmers was not very 
elaborate. When in the area, I asked around where I could locate cooperative 
members who would fit the above-mentioned criteria.  
I carried out the majority of interviews with producers in their homes and 
included visits to their farms. This enabled participant observation of various stages 
of coffee production as well as interviews with workers on the farms. Most of the 
farmers retained records of their coffee production and sales dating back several 
years, allowing data gathering of selling prices and costs charged by the 
cooperatives. To cross-check the information, several producers delivering their 
coffee to a processing plant were also interviewed. Farmers often personally 
delivered coffee to reception centers, as they wanted to ascertain that all coffee 
reaches its destination and they could personally witness weighing and quality 
evaluation of their product. 
 
  
Picture 2 Coffee is pre-dried and pre-selected on a farm. 
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The main topics discussed in the interviews were coffee production, income and 
costs, premium for social development, terms and channels of sales, changes made 
in coffee production due to certification, cooperative services, hired labor and their 
working conditions, experiences with conventional and organic production, and in 
the case of organically certified farmers, transition to organic production. The 
interviews took place during a period when international coffee prices had started to 
rise after having been extremely low for four to five years. The time was therefore 
good to inquire about the situation in previous years when prices were very low as 
well as the situation of rising coffee prices. To triangulate data, the issues were 
discussed with many different actors in the same cooperatives, including 
cooperative managers, farmers, and workers. 
The objective of the interviews was to inquire from farmers and representatives 
of cooperatives about their experiences with Fair Trade and conventional coffee 
trade. As Fair Trade certified farmers and cooperatives participate in both Fair 
Trade and conventional coffee trade, the objective was to hear about their 
experiences with both. The objective therefore was not to establish a treatment 
group of Fair Trade certified farmers and a control group of non-certified farmers 
and to compare these. However, some comparisons between Fair Trade and 
conventional coffee trade are made in this thesis based on experiences of Fair Trade 
certified farmers and cooperatives participating in both markets. Representatives of 
coffee export companies were also interviewed regarding conventional coffee 
markets in Nicaragua. Representatives of the two major coffee export companies in 
Nicaragua were interviewed on three levels: regional (reception centers in coffee-
producing regions), provincial (e.g. department of Matagalpa), and national 
(headquarters in Managua) regarding coffee prices and services provided to 
farmers. I also attended an international coffee conference in Managua and 
gathered information in several meetings and workshops arranged by coffee 
certifiers and cooperatives in Nicaragua. 
Additionally, FLO’s economic, social, and labor standards were utilized as 
benchmarks against which achievements of Fair Trade were evaluated. I was 
interested in determining how well Fair Trade stipulated price premiums reached 
farmers, whether working conditions met the criteria set by Fair Trade, and how the 
funds provided by the Fair Trade social premium were used. 
The way the Fair Trade system operates makes it complicated to assess the 
benefits of Fair Trade for various actors in the value chain. Most Fair Trade 
standards are quite abstract, including “long-term trade relationships”, although 
repeated sales/purchases are not required or monitored, and “democracy”, although 
the degree to which farmers are represented is left open. Fair Trade standards are 
divided into entry and progress levels rather than fixed benchmarks, which makes 
quantification of the impacts of Fair Trade very difficult or impossible (Raynolds, 
2009). During the research process, I identified areas, which I thought were 
possible to examine. These included whether labor conditions in Fair Trade coffee 
production exceeded labor conditions in general in rural Nicaragua, the advantages 
of Fair Trade/organic production over just organic or conventional production as 
well as prices received by farmers from conventional and Fair Trade markets. 
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To investigate labor conditions of workers in coffee processing, I interviewed 62 
workers at eight dry mills of coffee in Matagalpa and Las Segovias. Three of these 
dry mills were owned by Fair Trade certified cooperatives. These data were 
complemented by interviews with managers, treasurers, and technicians at these 
mills. The main objective of these interviews was to determine whether working 
conditions in Fair Trade certified processing plants differed from those in 
mainstream plants. I conducted interviews with workers both inside and outside the 
mills. In Matagalpa, I carried out most of the interviews by the roadside while 
workers waited for buses. This was a good location for interviews because, although 
buses passed by quite often, most workers waited for the cheapest buses, which 
passed by infrequently. The workers therefore had a lot of time for discussions. 
Unsurprisingly, workers interviewed outside the mills were more critical of their 
working place than those interviewed inside. According to these workers, visitors 
often come to the mill to ask about their working conditions, but they are afraid to 
say anything negative for fear of losing their job.  
 
Picture 3 Workers at a coffee dry mill in Matagalpa. 
Some of the early literature on Fair Trade and organic production is quite 
enthusiastic about the possibilities of these certification systems for small-scale 
farmers. Before starting fieldwork, I was under the impression that organically 
certified production represented a possibility for Fair Trade certified farmers to 
increase their income beyond that of Fair Trade production utilizing conventional 
methods. Most studies do not deal with this issue in detail, but only mention it in 
 29 
passing. Early on during the fieldwork I noticed that despite clear price premiums 
received, Fair Trade/organic farmers themselves were not convinced that their 
chosen method of coffee production was especially advantageous. I also noticed that 
many Fair Trade certified farmers did not want to become organically certified but 
preferred conventional methods of production even when assistance in transition to 
organic production was offered. Many farmers, including organic farmers 
themselves, believed that organic methods of fertilization lead to lower yields. I 
noted that this is a topic that is not much discussed in Fair Trade literature and an 
area where I could potentially add a new angle to academic discussions on Fair 
Trade since a large proportion of Fair Trade certified coffee is also organically 
certified.  
To complement the data collected in 2005–2006, I conducted follow-up 
interviews with 15 organic farmers and 15 of their non-organic farming neighbors 
during one month in 2008. Organic and non-organic farms obviously differ from 
each other in many respects such as altitude, soils, and skills of farmers. The 
selection of farms did not attempt to take these differences into consideration. An 
issue that was studied more carefully was cost of fertilization used by organic and 
non-organic farmers. This is an important issue because many organically certified 
farmers complained about the low yields achieved using organic methods. One 
possible explanation for low yields is a poor nutrition of coffee plants, which 
according to van der Vossen (2005) is hard to remedy using organic methods 
because coffee requires a relatively high amount of nutrients to provide high yields. 
It was therefore interesting to determine whether organic farming would be able to 
provide the same nutrients as non-organic farming with comparable costs, or 
whether organic farming is considerably more demanding in this respect in the case 
of Nicaraguan coffee farmers.  Because fertilization is a relatively simple activity, it 
was also possible to compare these costs. The data acquired from farmers were 
complemented by interviews with organic and inorganic fertilizer producers and 
sellers (Article II).  
To facilitate data analysis, I organized transcribed interviews and field notes by 
using the Atlas-Ti qualitative data analysis program. I classified the interviewed 
farmers according to the certifications that they possessed and their cooperative 
membership or lack thereof. I coded the texts by the themes covered in the 
interviews. This facilitated access to the materials relevant from the point of view of 
answering my research questions. For example, by coding all parts of the interviews 
that covered the Fair Trade social premium, I was able to collect all material on this 
topic in one place and to compare what farmers, workers and representatives of 
cooperatives had reported.  
4.2 Research Ethics 
To position myself as a researcher, I provide a brief description of my 
relationship to Fair Trade prior to starting this research and since then. When I was 
an undergraduate student in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Fair Trade started to 
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grow in Finland with the inception of the labeling system in 1999. Fair Trade 
enjoyed support among my university student friends and I, who were interested in 
issues of globalization, solidarity towards developing countries, and environmental 
questions. My Fair Trade activism was limited, but I knew several people involved 
with the Fair Trade national initiative in Finland. Since beginning this research, the 
association has been helpful in providing information, including establishing initial 
contacts with cooperatives and farmers in Nicaragua.  
When I started to do fieldwork in Nicaragua and to study Fair Trade more 
closely in academic discussions, I began to notice slight discrepancies in Fair Trade 
rhetoric and reality. This made me change some of my views on Fair Trade. The 
effectiveness of Fair Trade in transforming the lives of farmers and workers seemed 
superior in Fair Trade promotional materials to what appeared to be taking place in 
Nicaragua. I became friends with several people working closely with Fair Trade and 
Fair Trade certified cooperatives in Nicaragua. Many people I knew therefore 
supported Fair Trade and made a living from it. Providing critical views on Fair 
Trade was not always easy because of this. However, I believe that my job as a 
researcher is to point out the advantages as well as the deficiencies, constraints, and 
obstacles of Fair Trade, and that this can help the certification system (and the 
movement) to improve its function, serving the best interests of all parties involved. 
In the end, I have been more or less comfortable reporting both positive and 
negative outcomes of Fair Trade. Because of some criticism offered in my research 
on Fair Trade, I decided to keep the cooperatives anonymous. However, I mention 
some cooperatives by name when reporting their positive achievements.  
The research was funded by the Academy of Finland, University of Helsinki and 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. No part of the research was funded or 
ordered by actors directly involved in Fair Trade. I did not experience any kind of 
pressure from any of the funding sources for certain kinds of research results. 
Conflicts of interest occur when some researchers who publish academic research 
on Fair Trade also work as consultants for FLO or organizations closely involved in 
promoting Fair Trade or receive funding from them. I have not been employed or 
funded by organizations promoting Fair Trade. 
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5 Main Results  
5.1 Fair Trade for Cooperatives and Farmers 
Many Nicaraguan coffee cooperatives, which are now Fair Trade certified, started in 
the 1990s with very few resources at a time when the country suffered from the 
aftermath of civil war and an economic collapse. Government support to 
cooperatives has been minimal. Now these cooperatives have well-equipped offices, 
coffee processing plants, storehouses, and cupping labs, and they export a 
significant portion of all Nicaraguan coffee. In view of the many difficulties faced by 
the Nicaraguan coffee farming sector, these cooperatives have been successful. Part 
of this success is due to a large number of development projects, which have assisted 
the cooperatives. Financing for development through Fair Trade has also played a 
role (Raynolds et al., 2004; Bacon, 2005; Murray et al., 2006; MacDonald, 2007).  
Fair Trade regulates the minimum price, a premium for social development, and 
an organic premium. The current prices are summarized in Table 3. The prices are 
regulated only at one point in the coffee value chain, when coffee is bought by 
importers or roasters from a Fair Trade certified cooperative. Prices are not 
regulated when a cooperative buys coffee from its members (farmers), when a 
roaster buys coffee from an importer, when a supermarket chain buys coffee from a 
roaster, or when a consumer buys coffee from a supermarket.  
 
Table 3. Fair Trade prices for washed arabica coffee (US cents/lb) (Source: FLO 
2011b). 
Fair Trade minimum price 140 
Fair Trade premium 
20 (out of which at least 5 US cents/lb 
are to be invested in quality/productivity 
improvement) 
Total Fair Trade price 160 
Organic premium 30 
Total Fair Trade/organic price 190 
 
At the level of farmer organizations, the difference between Fair Trade regulated 
prices and the market price in New York can be used as an indicator of price 
premiums received by cooperatives. As is evident from Figure 1, the price advantage 
Fair Trade provides (Fair Trade premium) can be quite different in different market 
conditions. During the historically low coffee prices in 2000–2004 Fair Trade 
offered a substantial advantage to producer organizations. The representatives of 
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cooperatives interviewed for this study all agreed that Fair Trade was highly 
advantageous when the minimum price guaranteed up to two or three times the 
market price. Since 2004, coffee prices have been rising and the advantage provided 
by Fair Trade has been small. Especially between 2007 and 2013, the minimum 
price has been largely irrelevant because market prices have been close to or above 
the minimum price (ICO, 2013c). However, the minimum price can potentially 
guarantee a very large premium if market prices drop significantly below the 
minimum price (and if the minimum price is not adjusted to the new level of market 
prices).  
 
 
Figure 1 Fair Trade price (including the social premium), coffee market price (ICO 
indicator price for other mild arabicas), and Fair Trade premium (the price above market 
price offered through Fair Trade, including the social premium). The prices are daily 
prices from  October 1st, 1998 to April 8th, 2011. Fair Trade also entails costs of 
certification. These costs are not taken into account here. Source data: ICO (2011a) and 
FLO (2007a, 2007b, and 2011a). 
Although cooperatives are typically able to sell only a part of their production to 
Fair Trade markets, some producer organizations, especially those that had been 
Fair Trade certified for a long time, sold up to 80% of their production as Fair Trade 
certified. One interviewed cooperative leader said that before they gained 
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certification they were wondering “how fair is the Fair Trade market” when their 
neighboring cooperative could participate in it, but they could not, nor could they 
join the Fair Trade cooperative, which benefited from higher prices from Fair 
Trade/organic coffee.  
The advantage that Fair Trade provides to a cooperative can vary substantially 
depending on the market share a cooperative can reach and the level of conventional 
coffee prices. The minimum price reduces price risk for producer organizations, but 
does not remove it completely, because cooperatives typically sell to many different 
markets in addition to Fair Trade. Additionally, when market prices are above the 
minimum price, volatility of prices is the same with or without Fair Trade 
certification (Articles I and IV). 
Pre-financing is important for cooperatives because they have limited capital 
and they must buy coffee from their members before they can sell it to 
exporters/importers. Pre-financing to cooperatives is a requirement for buyers of 
Fair Trade coffee. Representatives of cooperatives had mixed experiences with pre-
financing. Loans were part of the negotiations between cooperatives and the 
companies buying from them. In many contracts, pre-financing was not offered. 
When it was included, cooperatives reported that the terms were not particularly 
favorable for them and that they would have received loans with similar interest 
from elsewhere (according to Fair Trade standards, cooperatives have to pay the 
cost of pre-financing). On the other hand, pre-financing was also used in some 
contracts outside Fair Trade so it was not only a feature of Fair Trade contracts. Pre-
financing is difficult to study in detail because access to purchasing contracts of 
cooperatives is limited.  
From the point of view of farmers, it is important to consider their access to 
markets. The market in Nicaragua is consolidated in the sense that the two largest 
coffee exporters, Exportadora Atlantic and CISA, export approximately half of all 
coffee. However, farmers can choose between these two and a large number of other 
coffee buyers, and thus, coffee trade is not an oligopsony in Nicaragua. Although 
transportation conditions are challenging, it is usually possible for farmers to reach 
many different buyers. Farmers sell both to buyers whose reception centers are 
located closer to them in rural areas and use public transportation to reach 
reception centers in towns. Exportadora Atlantic and CISA have the largest 
networks of coffee reception centers, which are located also in relatively remote 
areas. Small-scale coffee farmers in Nicaragua thus do have access to markets for 
their coffee, but cooperative membership has enabled them to access certified coffee 
markets (Article II).  
The prices that Fair Trade certified farmers receive depend on sales of 
cooperatives and costs deducted. Estimating price premiums received by Fair Trade 
certified farmers requires knowledge of what farmers were paid in certified 
cooperatives and through other market channels. Prices through various export 
companies change daily and there are no reliable statistics on prices paid. I received 
data on daily prices paid to farmers by one of the two largest export companies in 
Nicaragua and used this as a reference to estimate price premiums. During the years 
of coffee crisis in 2000–2004 successful Nicaraguan Fair Trade certified 
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cooperatives were able to pay a significantly higher price for coffee to their members 
than the mainstream market. Particularly high prices were paid by Soppexcca, a 
cooperative in Jinotega, which paid its members 84 US cents/pound (lb) of green 
coffee (non-organic) during the coffee cycle of 2003–2004. At the same time, 
Exportadora Atlantic S.A., one of the largest coffee export companies in Nicaragua, 
paid on average 48.8 US cents/lb between 1 December 2003 and 31 March 2004, a 
period corresponding to the peak coffee harvest in Nicaragua. After the recovery of 
world market prices for coffee since 2004, there has, however, been little difference 
between the net prices received by producers via Fair Trade and mainstream 
markets. The average price of coffee paid by Fair Trade certified cooperatives to 
producers during the 2004–2005 coffee harvest was 87.9 US cents/lb. In 
comparison, the average price paid by Exportadora Atlantic S.A. was 88.9 US 
cents/lb, ranging from 75.5 to 99.5 US cents/lb during the harvest. These figures 
indicate that if farmers were lucky in timing their sales, they were able to receive a 
higher price for their coffee in the mainstream market (Article I). The average net 
price paid to producers for Fair Trade/organic coffee in seven interviewed 
cooperatives was 111.1 US cents/lb in 2004–2005. The price for Fair Trade/organic 
coffee was clearly higher than the price for Fair Trade non-organic or conventional 
coffee, but the advantages from organic production are not clear-cut due to the 
demanding nature of organic coffee production (Article II). 
Higher market prices have presented problems for Fair Trade certified 
cooperatives. When prices offered by other buyers have exceeded prices paid by 
cooperatives, members of cooperatives have sold their coffee outside the 
cooperative, causing the cooperatives problems in fulfilling their contracts with 
buyers. The problem is especially serious when cooperatives have fixed contracts 
several years into the future. If market prices increase, as has been experienced in 
recent years, fixing a sale price that seemed attractive some time ago may result in a 
situation where the cooperative has to buy coffee from farmers at higher prices than 
they can sell it to importers.  
In addition to the prices, it is important to consider services provided to farmers. 
These could include, for example, credit, provision of agricultural inputs at 
favorable prices, transportation, or processing (Griffiths, 2011). In the case of coffee 
trade in Nicaragua, credit is especially relevant. Export companies gave credit to 
producers at an annual interest rate of 11%, while the studied Fair Trade certified 
cooperatives charged 18–22%. These interest rates are fairly modest in a developing 
country context and in a country where the annual inflation rate at the time was 
above 10% (Article I). Coffee buyers are able to offer these favorable interest rates 
because farmers have coffee as their collateral; the creditor expects to receive 
payment promptly as coffee. This arrangement also ensures that the farmer sells 
through the credit provider. The system is used both in conventional and Fair Trade 
coffee production/buying. However, Fair Trade certified cooperatives have not been 
able to provide their members with especially favorable credit. For many farmers, 
one year’s harvest is not enough to cover what they owe their creditor, and when 
credit is carried over to the next year the farmer is locked to same coffee buyer 
(Wilson, 2010). This is a disadvantage because these coffee farmers, whether Fair 
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Trade certified cooperative members or not, are not free to choose their association, 
or therefore, between the prices and services provided by different coffee buyers. 
The abilities of certified coffee farmers to produce coffee differ considerably due 
to differences in land ownership and yields. The land area that Fair Trade certified 
farmers interviewed for this study had in coffee production ranged from 0.7 to 49 
hectares (average 3.6 ± 2.9). The ownership of other land apart from coffee lands 
ranged from 0 to 49 hectares (average 9.8 ± 10.8). Based on records of cooperatives, 
roughly 90% of the farmers grow coffee on less than 3.5 hectares, but there is a 
larger variation in the farmers’ ownership of other land apart from coffee, and thus, 
possibilities for expansion of production vary. From the point of view of the amount 
of coffee produced, it is even more significant that there is large variation in the 
yields achieved by farmers. The interviewed farmers reported two-year average 
yields of productive organic coffee ranging from 131 to 1196 kg/ha (average 522 ± 
233). Uncertified and Fair Trade certified farmers utilizing conventional methods 
reported yields from 236 to 2629 kg/ha (average 812 ± 534). These figures indicate 
that there is a considerable yield gap; the yields achieved by most farmers are 
significantly lower than the best benchmark. Large variations exist in the volume of 
coffee produced due to differences in land areas and yields. Although detailed data 
were not collected to indicate an association between higher volumes of coffee 
produced and improved socioeconomic situation, it is possible that the poorest 
farmers invest the least in their coffee production, have low yields, and produce low 
volumes of coffee.  
As the amount of coffee produced by different Fair Trade certified farmers varies 
a great deal, the importance of coffee to their income also varies. If Fair Trade 
succeeds in its goal of increasing prices received by farmers, it is not the most 
marginal farmers within cooperatives who produce a very small amount of coffee 
who will benefit the most from this higher price, but rather farmers with larger 
coffee production, who are likely to be less vulnerable socioeconomically. 
Although Fair Trade provides some advantages to producer organizations, at the 
same time, their position in Nicaragua is precarious as cooperatives have not always 
been able to provide as attractive terms of trade to farmers as other coffee buyers. 
Due to lower quality requirements, faster payments,2 cheaper credits, and 
sometimes more conveniently located coffee reception centers, many farmers in Fair 
Trade certified cooperatives have sold a large portion of their coffee through 
conventional market channels, while retaining their cooperative membership and 
selling some of their coffee through it (Article I). 
 
                                                
2 Most Fair Trade certified cooperatives switched from delayed payments to immediate 
payments in 2005–2006 to prevent farmers from selling to conventional markets, which 
offered a similar price and immediate payments. 
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5.2 Fair Trade Pricing and Quality Conventions 
Fair Trade facilitates the marketing of product qualities that consumers would be 
unable to detect without the information provided by these conventions. In the case 
of Fair Trade, these qualities include the coffee being produced by cooperatives of 
small-scale farmers and subjected to standards set by Fair Trade, including 
regulations on labor conditions and environmental standards. Although this takes 
quality evaluation of coffee beyond its physical characteristics, these physical 
attributes seem to be quite important to those who buy coffee from Fair Trade 
certified cooperatives.  
When farmers were asked about changes they had made in coffee production 
due to certification or cooperative membership, almost all respondents mentioned 
improving coffee quality, meaning its physical characteristics, which can be 
improved by careful harvesting and processing. At the same time, the interviewed 
farmers did not mention other quality improvements such as improved labor 
conditions for hired workers or enhanced environmental performance (only when 
coffee was organically certified were environmental advantages mentioned). Some 
of the qualities that Fair Trade facilitates to market do not require major changes to 
be made by farmers, one of them being that once they join a Fair Trade certified 
cooperative they fulfill the criteria that the coffee they produce originates from 
small-scale farmers organized in a democratically governed cooperative. Their 
coffee production is also environmentally quite benign, especially when it has 
organic certification, but even non-organic small-scale coffee production often takes 
place under shade trees and utilizes a limited amount of agrochemicals.  
A test to determine whether, through Fair Trade, cooperatives and farmers have 
been able to upgrade their coffee production and successfully add value to their 
product by marketing various quality conventions is if they “get a better deal”, a 
higher coffee price, and more favorable credit arrangements compared with the 
alternatives. However, comparisons are complicated because Fair Trade employs 
various quality conventions and the price of the product depends on many 
attributes. This complicates the estimation of the effectiveness of Fair Trade in 
controlling prices at the one node where it aims to regulate them. Representatives of 
Nicaraguan Fair Trade certified cooperatives interviewed for this study reported 
that before their coffee is bought or sold they send samples to prospective buyers 
who taste the coffee and evaluate it for such qualities as fragrance, aroma, acidity, 
body, taste, and aftertaste. In the absence of quality definitions in Fair Trade price 
mechanisms, it remains ambiguous what proportion of the price is paid for the high 
physical quality of the product and what proportion for the various quality 
conventions that Fair Trade facilitates to market. The significance of the regulated 
Fair Trade price premium is diminished because buyers can require high physical 
quality from the product, resulting in a situation where high quality matches high 
price (de Janvry et al., 2010).  
In 2012, FLO started to publish information on typical quality premiums for 
various origins and types of coffee (FLO, 2012b). Quality premium refers here to the 
premium typically paid for a type of coffee without certifications. FLO requires that 
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these quality premiums be applied to the FLO pricing system. The price is formed as 
follows: the minimum price (or market price, whichever is higher) + Fair Trade 
social premium + organic premium (if applicable) + quality premium, typically paid 
for a type of coffee in a geographical region. However, assessing the physical 
characteristics of coffee is not straightforward and the same types of coffee from the 
same geographical area can have variations in price depending on, for example, how 
well the coffee was processed. While publishing typical quality premiums may help 
to reach an agreement on a price that is higher than market price for a product, the 
price still ultimately depends on valuation of the buyer and the seller who decide 
how much the coffee’s characteristics are worth overall. Controlling this price 
formation is challenging and it is likely that in many cases market mechanisms 
determine the price rather than Fair Trade regulations. As McCarthy (2006: 808) 
has argued, alternative trade networks such as Fair Trade can be diluted as they face 
dynamics that are characteristic of mainstream markets, in this case, a price that 
depends not on Fair Trade pricing standards, but is formed through evaluations of 
buyers and sellers. 
5.3 Social Premium and Minimum Prices 
The cooperatives studied reported having used the social premium for many 
different purposes. Grants have been given to children of cooperative members to 
complete vocational education, some health services have been established, and 
community houses and schools have been built. Many cooperatives have used a 
large part of the social premium to fund improvements in their own facilities or to 
help meet the costs of certification. In some cases, the social premium had simply 
been distributed to cooperative members as cash. As numerous development 
programs by NGOs, international organizations, and bilateral development aid also 
assisted cooperatives it was complicated to estimate which programs had been 
funded by the Fair Trade social premium and which had received funds from 
elsewhere. Most farmers knew about ongoing development projects, but were 
unable to specify which projects were funded by the premium.  
The use of the social premium is decided by cooperatives. The most vulnerable 
people are not in influential positions in cooperatives and the funds are not always 
directed to these individuals in coffee-growing communities. A cooperative manager 
commented to me that the farmers who produce the greatest volume of coffee argue 
that they have earned the greatest share of the social premium, which is tied to the 
volume of coffee sold as Fair Trade, and therefore, they should benefit most from it. 
Almost all of the interviewed farmers were unable to say how the decisions to use 
the social premium were made. This raises questions about whether decisions on 
the use the Fair Trade social premium are taken in a democratic and transparent 
manner as required by Fair Trade standards. Although improvements to cooperative 
infrastructure are important from the point of view of success in coffee markets, a 
more careful targeting of these funds to social needs is needed, if Fair Trade aims to 
remedy social problems (Article I). 
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Making the social premium a percentage of the retail price of coffee would make 
Fair Trade pricing more transparent to different actors in the value chain. For 
example, consumers would then know how much they are donating to social causes 
when buying Fair Trade products. At the moment, the social premium is 
approximately 19.5 euro cents of a package of 500 grams of coffee. If the package 
costs six euros, the share of the social premium is approximately 3.3% of the price. 
Calculating this requires knowledge that is not readily accessible to consumers such 
as information on Fair Trade pricing to cooperatives, conversion of pounds to 
kilograms, conversion of dollars to euros, and knowledge of how much green coffee 
is needed to produce half a kilogram of roasted coffee. Instead, consumers could be 
informed on the package that a certain percentage of the price of this product will go 
to advancing social goals in producing countries. This would be relatively simple to 
implement because retailers already have a comparable system for the payment of 
sales tax. As an improvement to the present situation, the social premium would be 
clearly detached from coffee price. The funds could either be distributed to producer 
organizations deciding on their use, as the social premium functions now, or other 
mechanisms could be developed to target social needs. 
The minimum prices can provide a considerable advantage to a cooperative if 
market prices drop drastically below the minimum price. However, the experiences 
of cooperatives interviewed for this study indicate that this is problematic from the 
point of view of equitable distribution of benefits from Fair Trade; some 
cooperatives can potentially benefit more than others depending on their sales 
volumes to Fair Trade markets. Similarly, farmer members of cooperatives with 
higher volumes of production stand to benefit more from a higher coffee price. 
Similar findings have been reported by other researchers in various contexts for 
example by Luetchford (2012:70, 71) in Costa Rica.  
According to FLO, minimum prices are set on the level where costs of 
sustainable production are covered. However, farmer income depends on costs of 
the factors of production, market prices for coffee, and exchange rates, and all of 
these change constantly and are different in various geographical regions where 
coffee is produced. Because future prices are hard to predict, regardless of the level 
where minimum prices are set, the future significance of them relative to the costs of 
production and market prices are unknown to all actors in the value chain. 
No adjustments were made to Fair Trade pricing for coffee from 1997 until 2006, 
because market prices of coffee remained low and Fair Trade prices were high in 
comparison. As market prices rose close to Fair Trade prices in 2005, questions 
arose regarding Fair Trade pricing. The response of Fair Trade to higher market 
prices has been to raise particularly the social premium and the premium for 
organic coffee.  
The Fair Trade social premium was 5 US cents per pound of green coffee from 
the inception of the system in 1997 until 2006. It was raised to 10 US cents per 
pound in 2007 and 20 US cents per pound in 2011. Since 2007, the Fair Trade 
minimum price has been increased by 17%, while the social premium has been 
increased by 300%, indicating that Fair Trade has diminished the role of the 
minimum price and increased that of the social premium. In the case of some other 
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products, Fair Trade has abandoned minimum prices altogether, instead having 
only a social premium that is paid on top of market prices. Of the 812 products in 
FLO’s pricing data base, 120 did not have a minimum price in 2011 (FLO, 2011b). As 
this study has indicated, in the case of coffee the minimum price has largely been 
irrelevant for years now due to its low level compared with market prices. 
5.4 Participation of Cooperatives, Farmers and Workers in 
Fair Trade Decision-Making  
Although Fair Trade involves representatives of coffee cooperatives in some 
deliberations on governing the certification system, for example asking their 
opinions during price reviews, the Fair Trade system is mostly unknown to certified 
farmers. Fair Trade provides consumers and other downstream actors with some 
information about where the coffee originates and the conditions of production, but 
the interviewed farmers had little knowledge about the other end of the value chain. 
The interviewed representatives of cooperatives believed that, similar to 
conventional coffee trade, Fair Trade downstream actors (roasters, export 
companies, retailers) have the greatest power in controlling product information. 
These companies have the best knowledge about the different product qualities and 
their value when sold to their markets. Both in conventional trade and in Fair Trade, 
these companies do not have to share this information with others in the value chain 
in any transparent manner.  
The experience of cooperatives that had close ties to their coffee buyers before 
Fair Trade certification has been interesting in this respect. Coffee buyers have 
frequently visited them and provided assistance in the form of financing projects 
aimed at improving living conditions or coffee processing. The term “relationship 
coffee” has been used to describe this type of association where close ties benefit 
both coffee buyers and sellers. In some cases, Fair Trade certification has meant 
what Raynolds (2009) has called a move away from personalized trade relationships 
to impersonalized negotiations through certification. In other words, earlier the 
terms of trade were negotiated in person and were based on trust and close ties 
between buyers (importers, roasters, NGOs/world shops) and sellers (cooperatives), 
but now certification standards reduce the need for personal contacts. In terms of 
convention theory, to some degree there has been a move from domestic 
conventions (close ties) to industrial ones (certification), building relationships have 
been outsourced to certification systems. 
Building conventions based on increased information flows between producers 
and consumers is challenging when buyers and sellers are far away from each other 
geographically but also in their way of thinking (Freidberg, 2003b). Although Fair 
Trade certification initiated from the wishes of coffee farmers in Mexico, and 
producers have representation in FLO decision-making bodies, the movement has 
been very much controlled by Northern actors (VanderHoff Boersma, 2009). 
Cooperative leaders do not regard Fair Trade as an equal partner, but as a Northern 
intervention, which presents ever-changing demands on them.  
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Among others, VanderHoff Boersma (2009) has demanded that Fair Trade 
should be governed in a more democratic fashion, involving producers in decision-
making more seriously. FLO decided in October 2011 to increase producer 
representation in its General Assembly to 50% of members (FLO, 2011c). This 
highest decision-making body of FLO used to be controlled by Northern actors, 
including representatives of national initiatives for Fair Trade and businesses. The 
degree to which small-scale farmers are involved in decision-making concerning 
Fair Trade is still questionable, as many of them do not even know they are Fair 
Trade certified and their understanding of the system remains very limited (Article 
I). Laborers in coffee processing and on coffee farms are also not represented in any 
deliberations on how Fair Trade should be organized, at least in Nicaragua. 
Additionally, the General Assembly only meets once a year. The board runs the 
system in practice, and it continues to be controlled by Northern actors, with only 
four of 14 members from producer countries (FLO, 2012c). Democratic governance 
of the Fair Trade system therefore continues to be a challenge. 
5.5 Low-Yield Agriculture 
Most small-scale coffee farmers in Nicaragua practice low-input low-yield 
agriculture. Almost all of the work is done by manual labor. Coffee is manually 
picked, selected, and processed, literally one bean at a time. Small hand-powered 
mills are predominantly used for de-pulping of coffee. Transportation of coffee sacks 
and production and transportation of fertilizers are done almost exclusively by 
human muscle force. As coffee is produced in a small land area with low yields, the 
volumes produced are small. It makes sense for cooperatives of small-scale farmers 
to try to capture a higher value for the small amount of coffee they produce by 
upgrading their products to certified markets as well as marketing the coffee, as they 
do, as “artisanal”.  
This type of coffee farming enables farmers to produce carefully selected beans 
of even ripeness and careful processing, but the work is arguably time-consuming. 
Even if coffee receives significant price premiums due to certifications or marketing 
as specialty coffee from smallholders, income from a very small volume of coffee is 
usually too low to make investments in improving productivity. Most farmers 
consider even the simplest machinery, such as motorized de-pulpers, to be beyond 
their investment capabilities. Low investments and financial constraints of farmers 
may perpetuate inequalities by creating poverty traps where marginalized farmers 
are unable to improve their situation. During fieldwork I observed very few young 
people under the age of 30 to be coffee farmers or willing to continue their family’s 
coffee growing tradition. Most young people dreamed about life in cities and abroad 
or had already left rural areas. 
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5.6 Working Conditions of Hired Labor 
Labor conditions for hired workers in coffee farming in Nicaragua are in general 
characterized lack of job security, fairly low wages (although these rise occasionally 
when there is a lot of demand for labor) and the employment of large numbers of 
temporary workers (Article I). Seasonal workers are hired in Fair Trade coffee 
production on farms, in transportation, and in coffee processing in dry mills. The 
wages in Fair Trade coffee production have corresponded with those prevailing 
widely in rural Nicaragua. Fair Trade does not require certified cooperatives or 
farmers to surpass local norms in this respect; the Fair Trade requirement is simply 
to pay wages required by law or those widely prevailing in the area, whichever is 
higher. During fieldwork in Nicaragua this standard seemed to have little relevance. 
The legal minimum wage was not very high and because there was abundant 
demand for labor during coffee harvest period, many employers – Fair Trade 
certified or not – had to surpass legal minimum wages to attract laborers.  
Fair Trade standards for hired labor were renewed in 2009 after fieldwork for 
this study had been completed (FLO, 2009b). Compared with the old standards 
(FLO, 2005), the new ones are more detailed and the applicability of the various sets 
of labor standards to different situations is more clearly defined and includes 
workers on coffee farms. Earlier, it seemed to be assumed that small-scale farmers 
do not contract a significant number of workers, and thus, no detailed Fair Trade 
labor standards would be required. However, farmers have diverse labor needs. A 
continuum of farmers exists, from very marginal farmers, who themselves are wage 
workers on other farms, to farmers who hire labor seasonally while much of the 
work is done by the farmers and their families, to farmers who oversee the work of a 
large number of hired laborers (Article I). As Fair Trade certified cooperatives have 
grown in size and improved their coffee-processing infrastructure, they have 
become large employers themselves, some of them employing hundreds of workers 
during the harvesting season. This has made covering labor standards of workers 
hired by cooperatives increasingly relevant.  
With the earlier standards, it was quite difficult to evaluate which standards 
would be applied to various situations such as seasonal or permanent labor on farms 
and in processing plants. While clearer and more comprehensive, some ambiguity 
also remains with the new standards. For example, it is left to the certifying agency 
to determine when the full scope of labor standards is applied: “where a significant 
number of workers are employed by a member of the organization, all standard 
requirements should be met. The focus of the compliance criteria as set by the 
certifier will be on the permanent workers. The certifier interprets “significant” 
number of workers on the basis of national labor law” (FLO 2009b:24). Loosely 
defined standards are good in the sense that they fit different contexts, but they also 
raise questions on the ability of certifications to significantly alter the way coffee is 
produced.   
One of the improvements to FLO’s labor standards is a clearer definition of what 
constitutes prohibited “child labor”. Children under the age of 15 years must not be 
contracted to work on Fair Trade certified farms. However, the children of farmers 
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can work, provided this does not jeopardize their schooling, health, or well-being 
and the working hours are limited (FLO 2009b:26). During fieldwork it was 
common to see children working on Fair Trade certified farms. Coffee harvesting 
season in Nicaragua is a time of vacation from school precisely for the reason that 
children can participate in the harvest. As possibilities for daycare are limited, hired 
workers bring their children with them to work in coffee fields. This is not in breach 
of FLO labor standards because these children are not “contracted” workers. As 
children in rural Nicaragua do a great deal of work in any case and as coffee 
harvesting is not one of the worst forms of child labor, it probably does not make 
sense to try to prohibit this completely. Instead of communicating to consumers that 
Fair Trade products have been made without child labor, FLO could argue that they 
work to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, which would more accurately 
reflect their own standards and realities in production, at least in the case of Fair 
Trade coffee production in Nicaragua.  
5.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Fair Trade Organic 
Coffee Production 
Small-scale coffee farms in Nicaragua are often quite well-suited for organic 
production in the sense that coffee is often grown under dense and diverse shade 
tree cover, utilizing limited inorganic inputs. This type of management is already 
close to meeting the requirements of organic production, and it offers numerous 
ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration, biodiversity protection, and 
water retention. Farmers also receive clear price premiums for organic coffee, and 
assistance from several NGOs has been available in gaining organic certification. 
Representatives of cooperatives with organic production interviewed for this study 
said that they could easily sell more Fair Trade/organically certified coffee than they 
produce. The supply and demand situation for Fair Trade organic coffee thus is 
completely different from Fair Trade non-organic coffee, where supply clearly 
exceeds demand and a large portion of certified coffee must be sold outside certified 
markets.  
The main constraint in organic production is that it is widely held among 
farmers and extension agents in cooperatives that yields in organic production are 
lower than what can be achieved using conventional methods. There are large 
numbers of both organic and non-organic farmers in Fair Trade certified 
cooperatives who only produce around 300 kg of coffee/ha. Although farms differ 
from each other in many respects (soils, altitude, skills of farmers, density of 
planting, etc.), comparing yields on different farms can give an idea about the level 
of yields possible to attain in Northern Nicaragua. Compared with the modest 300 
kg of coffee/ha, other farmers have reached three times higher yields in organic 
production and eight times higher yields with conventional methods (Article II). 
Organic production can increase yields in cases where the starting level is very low 
and a farmer moves from no fertilization to organic fertilization. However, organic 
production usually decreases yields when farmers move from higher intensity 
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conventional production to organic methods. These farmers reported yield 
decreases of approximately one-third. Organic certification seemed to be less 
common in the best coffee-producing areas with the highest yields because farmers 
were unwilling to jeopardize high yields.   
Because organic farmers reported decreases in yields after transition to organic 
production and because many small-scale coffee farmers produce a small amount of 
coffee, it is important to determine whether higher yields are possible using organic 
methods. One way to approach this problem is to compare the cost and feasibility of 
organic versus inorganic fertilization. The results of this study indicate that organic 
fertilization can be less expensive when large volumes of organic materials, such as 
cow manure and coffee pulp, are available near the farm. Although this is not the 
case with all coffee farms, many small-scale farms can be fertilized with these 
materials because they have coffee-growing and cattle-farming neighbors. However, 
although careful recycling of these nutrients makes sense and leads to general 
improvements in soils, organic fertilization is less effective in providing nutrients for 
crop growth; when the same amount of nutrients is provided with organic and 
inorganic methods, the crop plants absorb a larger share of the inorganic fertilizers 
because nutrients are released immediately, enabling timing the availability of 
nutrients to the fastest growing season of crop plants, while organic fertilizers 
release their nutrients slowly and not necessarily when they are needed (Berry et al., 
2002). Also the dense shade-tree cover, which is required in organic production, 
may partly explain why yields above 1200 kg/ha were missing among the organically 
certified producers studied. In very densely shaded coffee, the reduced amount of 
light decreases yields (Article II). 
Premiums from Fair Trade/organic coffee to farmers have been significantly 
higher when market prices have been low. In the cooperatives studied, the price 
premium for Fair Trade/organic coffee was on average 30.5% in 2005 and 7.6% in 
2008 (Article II). Because Fair Trade organic production does provide clear price 
premiums to farmers compared with conventional coffee, Fair Trade organic 
production raises farmer income when low-intensity organic farming is an 
alternative to low-intensity conventional farming. However, low-intensity farming 
produces very little coffee in the case of farmers who grow coffee in a small land 
area, keeping the incomes from coffee production very small. With higher intensities 
of management, comparing advantages of organic versus conventional management 
is complicated because lower yields in organic production must be taken into 
consideration, but it is hard to estimate how much lower the yields are than they 
would have been using conventional management.  
The Fair Trade price for organic coffee has not been extraordinarily high for 
high-quality Central American arabicas. Particularly during higher market prices, 
producer organizations have received similar prices for organic coffee without Fair 
Trade certification. In some cases, producer organizations first had organic 
certification and had to acquire Fair Trade certification due to its popularity among 
consumers, and thus, Fair Trade represented a condition for market entry rather 
than upgrading because this did not raise prices for them compared with the prices 
they had received previously from organic coffee without Fair Trade certification. 
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However, if market prices of coffee are low and coffee is not of high physical quality, 
Fair Trade can increase its price.  
FLO raised the organic premium from 15 US cents per pound in 20 US cents in 
2007 and 30 US cents in 2011. This 100% increase in organic premium is 
significant, but it indicates more a reaction to higher market prices rather than the 
ability of FLO to control prices. This is evident in Figure 1, which indicates that 
these price increases followed increases in market prices. As an example of the 
recent dramatic increases in coffee prices, in one Fair Trade/organically certified 
cooperative in Nicaragua the price paid to farmers for coffee more than doubled 
from 110 US cents per pound in 2004/2005 to 250 US cents per pound in 
2010/2011 (Pedro Rojas, personal communication on October 24th, 2011).  
Fair Trade/organic production has been advantageous to some farmers, 
especially during low market prices for coffee when the price premiums have been 
high, but the advantages are not clear-cut in all situations due to lower price 
premiums when market prices are high and due to lower yields compared with those 
that can be achieved using higher intensity conventional methods. 
5.8 Distribution of Benefits from Fair Trade in the Coffee 
Value Chain from Nicaraguan Farmers to Finnish 
Consumers 
Roasters, retailers, and brand owners exercise a high degree of control in value 
chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Gereffi et al., 
2005). In view of this, it is important to consider whether Fair Trade can alter this 
situation in favor of upstream actors. The results of our analysis on the distribution 
of benefits between various actors in coffee trade in Nicaragua and Finland indicate 
that consumers paid considerably more for Fair Trade certified coffee than for the 
other available alternatives (Article III). Although Fair Trade provided price 
premiums to producer organizations, a larger share of the retail prices remained in 
the consuming country relative to conventional coffee trade. Paradoxically, along 
with the certified farmers and cooperatives, Fair Trade empowers roasters and 
retailers. The premiums paid by Fair Trade consumers largely remain in Finland, 
and thus, are inefficiently transferred to producer countries.  
According to our estimation per package of coffee, approximately 15 euro cents 
more reached the producing country in 2006, while Fair Trade license fee in Finland 
and the cost of certification in the producing country were 13 euro cents per package 
of coffee. Consumers therefore paid almost as much for the administration of the 
Fair Trade system as they “donated” to producing countries in addition to giving 
retailers and/or roasters more than in conventional coffee trade. The administration 
of the Fair Trade system performs an important function, but the system could be 
more transparent in how much it benefits various actors in the value chain. 
Although Fair Trade regulates prices paid to producer organizations and requires 
transparency from them in documenting sales prices and costs of cooperatives, it 
does not regulate retail prices, nor does it require retailers or other actors in the 
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value chain to reveal their profit margins. One cooperative leader in Nicaragua 
complained that the transparency of the Fair Trade system ends when the truck 
loaded with coffee leaves their cooperative; after that the cooperative and the 
farmers do not know what happens to the coffee and who benefits from its sales and 
how much. McMurtry (2009:35) puts it this way: “The question then emerges why it 
is the producers in the economic South who have to conform to an externally 
imposed regime of monitoring while the often-questionable economic practices of 
distributors in the economic North are not subject to any parallel process.” 
Several researchers have reported that the share farmers receive from retail 
prices of coffee has declined, and this indicates the consolidation of power in the 
hands of retailers. At the same time, others report that retailers frequently sell coffee 
with negative margins to attract customers, which certainly often is the case in 
Finland (Talbot, 1997; Daviron and Ponte, 2005: 76; Article III). While it may be 
true that retailers have considerable power in food markets in general, selling 
conventional coffee for negative margins does not appear to wield exceptional power 
in the value chain. However, it appears that Fair Trade does provide retailers with 
exceptional power because it enables them to segment customers to buyers who are 
willing to pay a higher price for the content provided by the certification.  
Prices that are higher than market prices generally cause problems of 
oversupply. The International Coffee Agreement attempted to solve this problem by 
allocating production quotas for producing countries, which in turn sold export 
licenses to farmers and export companies. Fair Trade production is limited mainly 
through two mechanisms. First, Fair Trade production has a barrier to entry – 
certification – with a restricted number of producer organizations being certified 
(Guthman, 2007). Second, among the certified producer organizations, supply of 
non-organically certified Fair Trade coffee exceeds demand. The Fair Trade system 
gives traders, mostly export companies and roasters, who source green coffee, 
considerable power in deciding who sells to Fair Trade markets, as they are free to 
choose their suppliers amongst the certified producers. “Production quotas” 
therefore are distributed by coffee traders, whose coffee sourcing among certified 
producers is not regulated by the Fair Trade system. It is questionable how well Fair 
Trade empowers marginal producers in the value chain of coffee when those 
cooperatives with the longest involvement in Fair Trade markets that are able to 
provide high-quality coffee are the ones that are the major suppliers of Fair Trade 
coffee instead of the most marginalized cooperatives and farmers (Article III). 
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6 Conclusion 
Fair Trade attempts to regulate markets in favor of the less powerful, such as small-
scale farmers, their organizations, and laborers in developing countries, involving 
them in the governance of coffee value chains in establishing norms for conditions 
of production. In the case of cooperatives, farmers, and workers in Nicaragua, Fair 
Trade has provided some advantages, especially to cooperatives, and improvements 
through development projects it has financed. However, Fair Trade has brought 
limited possibilities for farmers or workers to participate in deliberations on altering 
production conditions. Although Fair Trade has been designed to offer an 
alternative to conventional trade, it re-creates some of the power relationships that 
exist in conventional trade, and therefore, Fair Trade has a limited ability to build 
more relational value chains, where there is close dialogue between more equal 
partners in trade and where coffee producers create and control value that is 
embedded in coffee quality. Based on experiences of farmers and representatives of 
cooperatives in Nicaragua, Fair Trade still seems to suffer from implementation of 
its system in a top-down manner. Although democratically governed NGOs in 
Northern civil societies may be active in promoting Fair Trade and participate in 
creating regulation of coffee trade, involving farmers and workers in Fair Trade 
governance is impeded by a weak institutional context where farmer and worker 
organizations suffer from limitations in their operation. In involving different actors 
in value chain governance, Fair Trade may be better serving the needs of 
downstream actors in the North rather than its intended beneficiaries, the upstream 
actors in the South.  
This study has highlighted some of the challenges involved in establishing 
minimum prices and questioned how well minimum prices can improve the position 
of upstream actors in the coffee value chain. This study has also paid attention to the 
situation of hired workers on coffee farms and in coffee processing, arguing that 
they should be involved in governing Fair Trade and targeted more clearly as 
beneficiaries of Fair Trade. Fair Trade would probably benefit from focusing more 
on social issues, such as assistance to vulnerable members of cooperatives, hired 
labor, and coffee farming communities in general, and paying less attention to 
attempts to control coffee prices, which involves many practical challenges as well as 
issues in equitable distribution of benefits. In this respect, Fair Trade would benefit 
from lessons learned during earlier decades when the International Coffee 
Agreements attempted controlling prices, especially how controlling prices became 
increasingly difficult in a more globalized world.  
The findings of this research echo those of other studies on Fair Trade coffee in 
concluding that the system is inefficient in transferring income from Northern 
consumers to Southern farmers.  Inequalities in the distribution value creation are 
higher in Fair Trade coffee than in conventional coffee, implying that in Fair Trade 
value chains the control of information on production processes brings limited 
benefits to its intended beneficiaries in the global South (Zehner, 2002; Mendoza 
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and Bastiaensen, 2003; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Kilian et al., 2006; Bacon et al. 
2008a: 344–345; Roquingny et al., 2008). Although in absolute terms Fair Trade 
has offered slightly higher prices to producer organizations, Fair Trade has also 
incurred costs to them decreasing the overall benefits.  
Fair Trade presents many opportunities for future research. Most research has 
been done on coffee production, but Fair Trade continues to expand to other 
products. Remarkably little research has been done so far on labor conditions in the 
production of various Fair Trade goods, many of which are produced on large farms 
employing hundreds of workers. Fair Trade labor standards have also evolved. 
Although this research suggests that the ability of Fair Trade to provide improved 
working conditions for hired labor is limited, it will be interesting to see whether the 
new standards result in changes to workers’ conditions.  
The higher representation of producer organizations in the FLO board presents 
interesting questions about how the movement might change as a result. Fair Trade 
USA (formerly known as Transfair) split away from FLO in the fall of 2011. Fair 
Trade USA received 6.7 million USD in licensing fees from sales of Fair Trade 
products in 2010. The same year, it paid 1.5 million USD to FLO. Fair Trade USA 
resented that it had to pay such a large amount for its membership, but had limited 
influence in governing the system, which is headquartered in Germany (Neuman, 
2011). In a further complication for producers, consumers, and researchers of Fair 
Trade, there are now two large Fair Trade organizations, which overlap in their 
operations in both producing and consuming countries (in the latter, at least in the 
US). Fair Trade USA continues to respect FLO’s Fair Trade standards, but aims to 
create standards of its own as well, duplicating standard setting, certification, and 
implementation. One of the changes implemented by Fair Trade USA is that it no 
longer restricts Fair Trade coffee certification to cooperatives of small-scale farmers, 
but makes certification open to all coffee producers regardless of their size or 
involvement in cooperatives. This gives more flexibility to companies sourcing Fair 
Trade coffee, enabling rapid expansion of Fair Trade in the US market, and makes 
Fair Trade certification accessible to more farmers, but this Fair Trade model no 
longer favors cooperatives over other coffee producers (Fair Trade USA, 2011). This 
is remarkable in view of the findings of this thesis, which suggest that if Fair Trade 
offers some alternative to conventional coffee production and trade, it is that it has 
supported and provided financing for developing cooperatives. 
Upgrading through Fair Trade and organic certification can function to some 
degree as a buffer against low coffee prices in the future. As argued by Beuchelt and 
Zeller (2013), from the point of view of improving the situation of small-scale coffee 
farmers in Nicaragua what makes more of a difference as an upgrading strategy is if 
cooperatives and farms can improve their operations to become well-managed 
rather than if they are able to acquire certifications and sell their coffee as certified. 
Fair Trade and various development projects have played roles in financing the 
development of cooperatives and farms, but much remains to be achieved. Many 
farmers are currently greatly indebted. Cooperatives are indebted or have limited 
capital reserves, which are sorely needed just to maintain their basic operation of 
buying coffee from their members. Many farmers produce low volumes of coffee 
Conclusion 
48 
providing very little income whether their coffee is certified or not. Stronger 
cooperatives and better-managed farms would be more likely to survive any future 
crises such as adverse weather conditions, coffee diseases, or low coffee prices. 
Beuchelt and Zeller (2013) propose that cooperatives build up their reserves in a 
process that is made transparent to members so that they understand that their 
shares are increasing. They also suggest an obligatory annual external auditing of 
cooperatives to avoid mismanagement and corruption. These actions would improve 
cooperatives’ creditworthiness to banks, reducing interest rates and improving 
access to credit. In the future, Fair Trade could play a role in these issues by, for 
example, financing extension services, external auditing of cooperatives, and 
creation of credit funds. 
Regulating globalization through private authority, consumer choice, corporate 
responsibility, and marketing of civic content of products places a great deal of 
responsibility on actors with limited experience in altering conditions of production 
in developing countries. Actors participating in governing certification systems, 
such as Fair Trade, are searching for their roles in regulating conditions of 
production and trade. Fair Trade has taken upon itself multiple roles in improving 
the situation of farmers and their organizations, regulating price floors and credit to 
producer organizations, setting standards for labor conditions, and other norms for 
production and providing financing for development of producer organizations, 
farms, and social conditions in coffee-growing communities. Many challenges 
remain in these tasks, providing opportunities also for researchers to continue 
finding out how Fair Trade can alter conditions of production and trade. 
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